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ABSTRACT 
 
Management of Intellectual Property in Supply Chain Outsourcing. 
 (August 2012) 
Rajorshi Sen Gupta, B.S., University of Calcutta; 
M.A., Jawaharlal Nehru University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. H. Alan Love 
 
 
Firms outsource productive tasks to different locations in order to exploit factor 
price differentials and gain efficiencies from specialization. However, the benefits of 
outsourcing come with two risks. The first problem occurs when firms share their pre-
existing intellectual property (IP) such as database and trade secrets with contractors. 
While IP is shared to facilitate the outsourcing project, the contractor may behave 
opportunistically and misappropriate the IP for its own benefit. Since firms derive 
significant value from their IP, this can lead to severe economic damages in terms of 
reduced market share and brand value. The second agency problem arises due to non-
contractible effort exerted by the contractor. Depending on the outsourced task, shirking 
can lead to higher costs and poor quality product. In this dissertation, contractual 
solutions are developed to mitigate these agency problems associated with outsourcing.  
First, several IP misappropriation cases are enumerated in the context of 
outsourcing. The existing literature is reviewed and the limitations are addressed in the 
light of these actual cases. Second, theoretical models are developed by considering two 
 iv 
forms of IP misappropriation, depending on whether a R&D contractor emerges as a 
direct competitor of the principal firm, or the contractor sells the principal’s IP to a 
competitor.  Contracts are developed to implement a “carrot and stick” strategy, whereby 
firms share limited IP with their contractor and also provide incentive payments to deter 
shirking problem. It is shown that complementary strategies like product differentiation, 
task modularization, and investment in technological solutions can be useful when legal 
enforcement is weak. It is also demonstrated that even under the possibility of IP 
misappropriation; firms may gain from outsourcing if in-house inefficiency is high. 
However, if legal enforcement is weak, outsourcing would entail higher transaction 
costs. Finally, an event study is conducted to examine the effect of trade secret 
misappropriation on the value of Lexar. While Lexar is still outsourcing, it is explored 
how Lexar survived the IP misappropriation problem through product differentiation and 
marketing strategies.    
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Overview  
“It is maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt to make at 
home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. What is prudence in the conduct of 
every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country 
can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of 
them with some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we 
have some advantage.” - Adam Smith (1776). 
Adam Smith’s explanation of “make or buy” decision is the heart of the 
phenomenon called outsourcing. It has emerged as a business practice whereby firms 
contract different tasks or services to outside agents.  
In earlier days, coordination of tasks required geographic proximity. Since 
transportation of intermediate inputs and partially processed goods used to be slow and 
costly, there used to be agglomeration of production instead of fragmentation. With 
modern innovations in communication technologies, reduced transportation costs, 
fragmentation of production became inevitable. As Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006) point out, detailed information about product specifications and the tasks that 
need to be performed can now be conveyed electronically. Partially processed goods can 
be transported more quickly and at lower cost than ever before. Modern innovations  
____________ 
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in information technology (IT) and communication have enticed firms to exploit the 
resources distributed across the world. Firms are therefore outsourcing productive tasks 
to different locations in order to exploit factor price differentials and efficiencies on a 
world-wide scale.  
In this section, some operational definitions are introduced to facilitate 
discussion. The existing literature uses different nomenclatures for the parties involved 
in outsourcing relationships. Here the terms “principal” and “agent” in are used to 
delineate the contracting party and contractor. Alternative interpretations of principal 
and agent are as follows: 
 
Table 1.  Different Interpretations of Principal and Agent 
 
Principal Agent 
Product company/ Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) 
Contract Manufacturer (CM),  
Contract Design Manufacturer (CDM) 
Pharmaceutical or  
Biotechnology company 
Contract Research Organization (CRO) 
Customer Supplier 
Client Vendor/ Service Provider 
OEM Electronics Manufacturing  
Service provider (EMS) 
Outsourcer Outsourcee 
 
 
 
Outsourcing occurs when a principal delegates operations/tasks that it could have done 
in-house to an independent agent. As a firm outsources, it enters into a contractual 
relationship with the contractor. Offshore outsourcing occurs when a principal moves 
part of the production process or services to an agent located in a foreign country. Thus 
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the geographic location of the principal’s headquarter is different from the location of 
the agent. Onshore outsourcing occurs when the location of the agent is same as the 
location of the principal’s headquarter. 
 
1.2 Factors Contributing to R&D Outsourcing  
 R&D used to be looked upon as a sacrosanct core area for the companies. While 
the trend of outsourcing non-core support functions such as Information Technology (IT) 
has been common, outsourcing has not remained confined to low skilled tasks. These 
days, companies have been looking to outsource core activities like R&D as well. 
Companies like Dell, Motorola, and Hewlett-Packard (HP) are outsourcing complete 
designs from outside developers. Likewise, Boeing Co. has been working with HCL 
Technologies of India to co-develop software for everything including navigation 
systems and landing gear to cockpit controls for the 787 Dreamliner jet (Businessweek, 
2005b). Previously, pharmaceutical companies used to outsource routine tasks like 
clinical trials and low cost manufacturing of established drugs. More recently, these 
companies have begun to outsource R&D services like drug discovery to Contract 
Research Organizations (CRO). Evidently, the importance of R&D outsourcing is ever 
increasing. In 2010, $42 billion out of the $105 billion global drug development 
spending was through outsourcing contracts (www.prleap.com). According to Gartner, 
worldwide semiconductor outsourcing services revenue is estimated to grow to $66.8 
billion in 2012 (www.gartner.com).  
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Yet, the approaches and extent of outsourcing has been quite different among 
companies. While Dell outsources most of the design for notebooks, Apple does the 
design in-house to the extent that it specifies “Designed by Apple in California” on each 
iPod and iPad. Motorola outsources complete design for its cheapest phones, but 
controls all of the development of high-end phones like Razr (Businessweek, 2005b). 
These alternative approaches may be understood in terms of the following example. 
Hypothetically, let us consider a researcher who wants to write a research paper. When 
would that researcher want to do the research and write a paper herself and not 
collaborate with others? Generally speaking, if: a) the researcher is confident that her 
own ability is sufficient for the project; b) there is low project uncertainty, i.e. the goals 
are well defined; and, c) time is not an issue, then the researcher can accomplish all tasks 
like data collection, data analysis, and interpreting the results herself. In other words, the 
researcher will pursue an in-house approach to write the paper. 
On the other hand, if the researcher knows that there is: a) a chance that she 
might not be able to accomplish all the tasks herself; b) there is huge uncertainty in the 
project; and, c) the project may require more time to complete than what is available; the 
researcher  might outsource some R&D tasks to her peers. For instance, data collection 
or the literature review might be outsourced to someone else. Accomplishing these tasks 
involves time, which may be reduced by outsourcing and thus the researcher can 
concentrate on core competence, like conducting data analysis and interpreting the 
results.  
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The above description fits quite well with R&D done by firms. For biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies, the cost of conducting R&D is extremely high. The cost of 
bringing a drug to market from concept stage is approximately $1 billion and can take 
10-15 years. There is huge uncertainty in drug development; out of 5,000 drugs tested, 
about five reach the clinical trial stage and typically only one is approved by the FDA. 
Likewise, for semiconductor chips, it costs $1-2 billion in leading edge process 
technology development, $40-$50 million in chip design and $5-7 billion for an 
advanced fabrication facility (Chip Design, 2011). Thus we observe that biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical and semiconductor companies have been outsourcing innovation more 
extensively. 
In contrast, innovation in the food and beverage industry is typically incremental. 
For example, new flavors may be introduced in existing products lines or product shapes 
or colors may be changed. These innovations are generally characterized by lower cost 
and less uncertainty. Thus most food and beverage companies prefer to conduct R&D in-
house. Generally, in these cases, the companies maintain internal expertise and keep 
R&D in-house. For instance, H-E-B, the supermarket chain maintains a new product 
development staff and develops private label products in-house.  
 
1.3 Benefits of Outsourcing 
 Before discussing the problems of outsourcing, a brief review of the benefits of 
outsourcing is warranted. It may be argued that lower cost has been the primary 
motivating factor behind outsourcing. Figure 1 is useful to comprehend the factor  
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price differentials in offshore outsourcing.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Comparison of Costs in U.S. and China and India  
Source: Stevenson (2008) 
 
The wage rate for an offshore Java developer ranges from $20-$40 per hour, compared  
to  $150 per hour for a U.S. based developer and the average annual salary of an  
engineer in U.S. is $70,000 compared to $13,580 in India (Vogel and Connelly, 2005).  
In software development and IT related industries; outsourcing driven by a cost cutting 
rationale is hard to escape. According to McKinsey Global Institute (2003) estimates, in  
2010, the U.S. IT industry saved $390 billion through offshore outsourcing of software 
development.  
 7 
 Motivations behind outsourcing R&D to offshore locations extend beyond cost. 
General Motors (GM), for example, uses its design studio in Bangalore, India to develop  
blueprints for new models. As pointed out by Darwin Allen, director of product  
communication with GM, "Obviously you are aware of [cost savings], but the real  
motivation is to find people with expertise” (Yee, 2008). Similarly, the drug giant  
Bristol-Myers Squibb notes, outsourcing has become so vital in the pharmaceutical  
company's infrastructure and drug discovery strategy that it  can no longer be considered  
an option, but has become a strategic asset. Cost  savings is no longer the only  
factor (www.outsourcing-pharma.com). Pharmaceutical  companies outsource clinical  
trials to CRO in order to reduce testing time and hence overall costs. Essentially,  
outsourcing enables companies to access external expertise that is unavailable or too  
costly to do in-house. The following examples demonstrate this point.  
a) Nokia was facing increasing pressure for not having the popular ‘clamshell’ designed 
phone in its product range, thereby limiting its scope in Asian markets. Nokia decided to 
outsource the complete product design from BenQ, a Taiwanese original design 
manufacturer (ODM).This enabled Nokia to reduce the capital required to do the R&D 
in-house (Himola et al., 2005).  
b) The Volvo 850 model required an extremely narrow, short gearbox for automatic 
transmission. But Volvo lacked internal expertise to produce such a complex design in 
time to meet its product launch deadline. Hence it contracted the gearbox design to the 
outside supplier Aisin Seiki (Novak and Stern, 2009). 
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c) Eli Lilly transformed itself from a fully-integrated pharmaceutical company (FIPCO) 
into what it refers to as a fully-integrated pharmaceutical network (FIPNET). The 
company outsources in order to increase capacity and get access to external capabilities. 
This organizational transformation has been realized through outsourcing of early-stage 
development works to ChemExplorer and PharmExplorer in China and discoveries to 
Jubilant in India (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
d) Designs are becoming complex and products are having shorter lifecycles. Many 
computer companies like Dell and Sony are outsourcing design and manufacturing to 
contract agents. Motorola outsources design of lower priced phones. 
All of the above examples concur with Adam Smith’s basic idea that a task may 
be outsourced when it cannot be done with one’s own internal resources at sufficiently 
low cost. However, it is important to note that the benefits of outsourcing come with 
several problems like loss of control, quality deterioration, and issues related to IP. This 
dissertation addresses the problem of IP protection in outsourcing.  
 
1.4 Problems Related to Intellectual Property  
1.4.1 IP Ownership  
Firms can achieve sustainable competitive advantage from creation, ownership, 
protection, and use of difficult to imitate IP/ knowledge assets (Teece, 2000b). Modern 
enterprises derive significant value from their IP. There have been suggestions that as 
much as 75 percent of the market value of a typical U.S. company resides in IP assets 
(ASIS International Report, 2007).  The World Intellectual Property Organization 
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(WIPO) emphasizes two critical IP related concerns in offshore outsourcing: ownership 
of IP and inadvertent, accidental or willful disclosure of confidential information and 
trade secrets that result in IP loss. Companies risk IP and business knowledge loss when 
they outsource tasks to suppliers. Further, when IP development involves offshore 
outsourcing, the problem becomes even more serious because of cross country 
differences in IP protection. Specifically, R&D outsourcing can be riddled with several 
risks related to IP: 
• Principal may become dependent on outsourcing agent because she did not invest 
to develop internal resources for new knowledge creation on her own. This may 
ultimately result in supplier lock-in, where the principal suffers economic loss 
from terminating the relationship with the outsourcing partner.  
• The principal could jeopardize core competencies by sharing proprietary 
knowledge with the agent.  
• As the principal outsources R&D, know-how is transferred to the agent. In the 
extreme, this can lead to irreversible loss of the principal’s core competence to 
the agent.  
• Failed outsourcing relationships might lead to leakage of proprietary technology 
to rival companies.  
Suppose a principal outsources a software writing task to a contract agent. The IP 
created within an outsourcing relationship is referred to as foreground IP. If the IP 
created from the outsourcing relationship is protected, then the company can earn rents 
from that IP. However, in certain situations the agent can leak the IP to competitors of 
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the company and, in that case, the rents will be dissipated. Another key concern for a 
principal is ownership of IP developed by the agent. Even when ownership is clearly 
specified in the contract, the vendor may behave opportunistically ex-post. For example, 
in the 1990s, Borden Foods Corp. developed a fully cooked, shelf-stable pasta and meat 
sauce meal. To do so, unique software driven system was outsourced from a developer, 
which eventually led to IP ownership problem between the manufacturer and the 
developer (Higgins, 2009).  
 The existing literature acknowledges this type of ex-post opportunism problem in 
outsourcing and offers suggestions to mitigate them. As pointed out by Clemons and Hitt 
(2004), software development contracts are incomplete, implying that it is impossible to 
specify all future contingencies that might arise. Incompleteness of contracts leads to the 
hold-up problem. One way to solve the hold-up problem is to allocate the property rights 
appropriately, as suggested by the theory of Property Rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990). Using this theory, Aghion and Tirole (1994) argue that property 
rights should be owned by the party whose effort is most critical to an innovation 
project. More recently, Walden (2005) argued that in software outsourcing contracts, the 
client should give some share of the benefit to the vendor when there is a possibility of 
knowledge spillover.  
  In an outsourcing relationship, bilateral hold-up problems can occur. After the 
agent sinks a (non-contractible) relationship specific investment, the principal can hold 
up the agent by demanding a share of rents resulting from the investment made by the 
agent. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, the principal may also be subject 
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to a hold up problem. As Clemons and Hitt (2004) point out, in the outsourcing literature 
the imposition of unplanned, higher fees, vendor’s threats to discontinue service or by 
other unmanageable threats is frequently termed as vendor hold-up (Aron et al. 2005).  
One way to prevent hold-up problems is to use contractual safeguards. Many U.S. 
companies accomplish this by including a “work for hire” clause in software 
development contracts to ensure that the principal retains the copyright for the work 
being done by the agent. It should be noted that “work for hire” clause is based on the 
U.S. copyright law concept, which may be ineffective in offshore outsourcing locations. 
For instance, under the Indian law, the “work for hire” concept does not apply to a 
situation where the author is independent party; it applies only in an employer-employee 
situation. Thus an Indian software company that develops software for a U.S. company 
would own the software. Similarly, when companies outsource tasks to China through 
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE), unless specified in the R&D contract, the 
parent does not have ownership of IP just because it owns the WFOE. Therefore 
outsourcing contracts must clearly specify the ownership of IP. Following the 
incomplete contracting literature, property rights should be assigned to the party whose 
investment matters most in the project under consideration.  
 
1.4.2 IP Protection in Outsourcing  
 In addition to ownership of foreground IP, the protection of pre-existing or 
background IP of the principal is also a key concern in outsourcing. Companies usually 
possess a portfolio of pre-existing IP comprised of technological know-how, software, 
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database, technological process, and trade secrets. As companies outsource tasks, they 
need to share pre-existing IP with their contract suppliers. Under certain circumstances, 
the supplier can misuse this information for its own benefit. It can use the shared IP to 
create knockoffs that are cheaper substitutes of the original product, or sell the shared IP 
to a competitor.   
  Before discussing how the extant literature addresses the problem of IP 
protection in outsourcing, it is worthwhile to examine some real life cases of IP 
misappropriation that occurred in outsourcing. There are three objectives in enumerating 
these cases. First, actual examples of IP misappropriation are not identical. It is 
important to understand the intricacies of the cases before any meaningful suggestions 
might be offered. Second, these examples are used to build up several assumptions of the 
analytical models developed in Chapter II and Chapter III. Finally, in light of these 
examples, shortcomings of the existing literature on IP protection in outsourcing are 
uncovered. Further, the examples help identify how this dissertation contributes to the 
literature in terms of offering unique solutions to the problem of IP protection in 
outsourcing. 
 
1.4.3 Examples of IP Violation in Outsourcing 
 Example 1: Motorola had outsourced design and manufacturing of mobile 
phones to BenQ, a contract manufacturer in Taiwan. Eventually BenQ started selling its 
own brand of mobile phones in China (Businessweek, 2005b). The contract was 
consequently cancelled by Motorola.   
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 Example2: Boston based shoe manufacturer New Balance outsourced 
manufacturing to a supplier located in China. After the end of contract, the manufacturer 
did not return IP owned by New Balance, including molds, product specifications, signs, 
labels, and marketing information. The outsourcing supplier launched a competing line 
of shoes under his own brand. Eventually, New Balance was awarded $9.9 million in 
damages for the 200,000 shoes that the agent sold after termination of contract. In an 
effort to reduce such risks going forward, New Balance reduced the number of 
outsourcing suppliers, increased monitoring effort to control production, and changed to 
a high-tech label that was more difficult for counterfeiters to copy (Kahn, 2002). 
 Example 3: Tiwana et al. (2008) point out that offshoring can expose core 
technologies and business processes of clients to offshore vendors. IBM had outsourced 
manufacturing of personal computers to Lenovo, who later emerged as a competitor 
(Arruñada and Vázquez, 2006). Similar to the IBM-Lenovo case, General Electric (GE) 
had outsourced production of microwaves to Samsung. Eventually, the latter became 
major manufacturer of microwaves. Automobile companies extensively outsource parts 
from component suppliers, who often develop to a stage where they are capable of 
becoming producers of entire vehicles. The component suppliers can eventually enter the 
market with their own vehicles (The Economist, 1998). These are examples of how an 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)’s outsourcing strategy can give rise to 
competing firms. The OEM shares proprietary pre-existing IP including production 
know-how and design, with its contract manufacturer (CM), who then uses the 
information to become an independent firm competing with the OEM. Essentially, by 
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virtue of manufacturing products for an OEM, the CM gains enough information and 
expertise that it becomes successful in launching its own brand eventually.  
 Example 4: General Motors’s (GM) local partner in China is Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). Chery, a Chinese carmaker was owned in part 
by SAIC. In 2003 Chery launched a mini car model (QQ) seven months earlier than the 
launch date of GM’s Chevrolet Spark. The QQ and Spark were very similar in design 
and later investigations revealed that the two vehicles share almost identical body 
structure, exterior design, interior design and key components. Not only was QQ 
introduced earlier than Spark, it was also cheaper than Spark by $1500 (Liu and 
Fernandez, 2007). In December 2004, GM Daewoo sued Chery for unfair competition in 
the Second People’s Court in Shanghai. GM claimed that QQ was a knock off of Matiz, 
a model owned by GM Daewoo. It was found that proprietary information like product 
specifications and formulae were indeed compromised during the development of Spark 
(www.autoweb.net, Businessweek, 2005a). Chery used the stolen information to build 
QQ without investing the time and money. QQ was favorably accepted by the consumers 
and sales of Spark were much lower than expected. The case was finally settled privately 
with an undisclosed amount.  
 Example 5: Novak and Stern (2009) point out that when a system is outsourced it 
is likely that trade secrets will leak. Knowledge about new innovations or designs may 
inadvertently be revealed to competitors when outsourcing suppliers exploit knowledge 
gained in one partnership in bidding on future projects. The 2001 lawsuit between 
DaimlerChrysler and GM was based on the argument that Chrysler had outsourced Jeep 
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grilles to AM General and eventually the design was passed on to GM. Daimler charged 
that the GM Hummer H2 grille was “borrowed” from the Jeep grille design. 
 Example 6: Software companies share their IP (e.g. source codes1 for testing and 
debugging) and sensitive systems designs (for applications development) with their 
contractors. By doing so, they face the risk of losing their IP. For example, SolidWorks 
Corp., a U.S. based software company had outsourced debugging tasks of its 3D 
computer aided design (CAD) to Geometric Software Solutions Ltd. in India. An 
employee of the offshore company stole the program source code and tried to sell it to 
SolidWork’s competitors. The employee was charged with theft but he might win the 
case since the source code did not belong to Indian company and therefore the Indian 
laws would not be applicable (Fitzgerald, 2003). Jolly Technologies, a California based 
software manufacturer had similar adverse experience when it offshored R&D to an 
Indian company (Frank, 2005). It has been suggested that lack of legal enforcement is 
the root cause of these misappropriation cases.  
Example 7: Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a) cite the case of Point Solutions Ltd. vs. 
Focus Business Solutions Ltd. In 2001, Focus had outsourced software development and 
review task to Point. Focus shared some of its proprietary codes with Point so that the 
latter can accomplish the task. After Point had received the contract, it began to develop 
its own competing software. The rapid development of the competing software by Point 
was possible because it had access to source code shared by Focus. Focus claimed that it 
had lost competitive advantage due to the IP misappropriation problem.    
                                               
1
 Source code is a blueprint that specifies the functionality of a computer program. 
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Example 8: Lexar Media shared its IP with Toshiba under a Non Disclosure 
Agreement (NDA) before engaging in a joint development project. Later, Toshiba  
and SanDisk announced joint development of similar technology. Lexar alleged that 
Toshiba had utilized Lexar’s trade secrets in Toshiba’s product line, like NAND flash 
chips, Compact Flash cards, XD-picture cards, Secure Digital cards. Not only was 
Toshiba a significant partner of Lexar in several joint development projects, Toshiba had 
placed a member in the board of directors of Lexar. This left Lexar’s IP (Multipage 
Write Technology) and trade secrets exposed to Toshiba and led to the eventual leakage 
to its competitor SanDisk (Burgess and Power, 2008, pp.24). 
Example 9: Danone and Wahaha established a joint venture contract in 1996. In 
2007, Danone pulled out of the joint venture alleging that Wahaha was selling a 
competing line of soft drink products using an outside network of operations. This 
parallel business was a breach of the joint venture contract. Danone estimated the losses 
to be $100 million (Wall Street Journal, 2009).    
Example 10: This exemplifies the problem of IP protection in R&D outsourcing. 
In order to maintain anonymity, the principal is denoted as P and agent as A. P had a 
unique idea and outsourced the task of writing software code for the envisaged project to 
A. Eventually A had developed a competing product while he was still working on the 
P’s project. A had successfully launched his product much earlier than P was able to. P 
sought legal means and the case was settled privately. This case provides several 
valuable insights for companies willing to outsource. First, the reasons for outsourcing 
matches those described earlier in section 2.1: P did not have the internal expertise to 
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write the code in-house. The task of writing codes is subject to uncertainty and tight time 
constraint. Thus P had outsourced the R&D task to A, who had better expertise in code 
writing. Secondly, the main problem in this example is that no formal contract was 
written between the P and A. If a company outsources the development of software it 
needs to ensure that it owns the IP on the developed software. But in real life, as in this 
case, it is difficult to delineate the ownership of IP in the first place. Thus the knowledge 
shared by the P was difficult to verify by the court. These cases are summarized in Table 
2 in terms of common characteristics.  
 
Table 2.  Actual Cases of IP Misappropriation in Outsourcing 
 
Principal (P) 
Agent (A) 
 
Outsourced task Nature of 
knowledge 
sharing 
Type of IP 
violation 
Outcome 
P:  Motorola 
A: BenQ 
 
Design   Set up 
competing 
brand 
Contract was 
cancelled  
P:  New Balance 
A: Contract 
manufacturer 
Manufacturing Product 
specifications, 
molds, signs, 
labels, 
marketing 
information 
Set up 
competing 
brand 
P was awarded 
$9.9 million in 
damages, P 
changed to a 
high-tech label 
that was difficult 
to copy 
P:  IBM  
A: Lenovo  
Manufacturing Product 
specifications 
Emerged as 
competing 
brand 
IBM sold PC 
business to 
Lenovo 
P:  GE 
A:  Samsung 
Manufacturing Product 
specifications 
Emerged as 
competing 
brand 
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      Table 2 Continued 
Principal (P) 
Agent (A) 
 
Outsourced task Nature of 
knowledge 
sharing 
Type of IP 
violation 
Outcome 
P:  GM Daewoo 
A:  SAIC 
 
Joint 
development 
project 
Product 
specifications 
and formulae 
Set up 
competing 
firm 
Spark's design 
was unpatented in 
China. Therefore 
GM could not 
seek patent 
protection. 
 
Privately settled  
P:  Daimler Chrysler 
A: AM General 
 
Jeep grille  Used IP to 
create grilles 
for GM  
 
P: SolidWorks/Jolly 
 
A: Geometric 
Software Solution 
Company/contract 
R&D center  
 
Debugging 
software codes 
Source code Intended to 
sell source 
code to 
competitor  
Legal 
enforcement 
problem; 
prosecution was 
difficult as IP did 
not belong to 
Indian company. 
 
Jolly pulled out  
R&D activities 
from India. 
P:  Focus Business 
Solutions 
A:  Point Solutions  
 
 
Software 
development 
and review of 
product 
Source code Developed 
competing 
software 
Focus lost 
competitive 
advantage 
P:  Lexar 
A: Toshiba 
 
Joint 
development 
project 
Multipage write 
technology 
Shared IP 
with Sandisk, 
a competitor 
of Lexar. 
Settled for 
$465million 
P:  Danone 
A: Wahaha 
Manufacturing  Established 
parallel 
business that 
competed 
with the joint 
venture.  
Privately settled 
P:  Anonymous 
A: Anonymous 
 
Software coding Business plan 
and codes 
Set up 
competing 
firm  
Privately settled 
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The following commonalities are identified across these cases.  
i. The principal shares its IP with the agent. This IP is pre-existing or background 
IP owned by the principal. 
ii. After the principal shares its IP with the agent, the latter learns the technology. 
iii. The agent behaves opportunistically. In particular, the agent misappropriates the 
technology towards its own benefit.  
iv. The misappropriation of IP can take various forms. After the principal discloses 
its pre-existing IP with the agent, the latter may  
a) use the information to learn the technology and eventually set up an 
independent competing firm, or  
b) sell the IP to a competitor of the principal firm.  
v. Legal enforcement of contracts may be difficult. The agent can continue selling 
the counterfeit/knock-off product even after injunction is imposed. This is 
irrespective of the geographic location of the agent.  
vi. While litigation is an option, it can be extremely costly with uncertain outcomes. 
It is evident from the above examples that knowledge sharing by the principal is 
necessary in outsourcing projects. However, this is also the source of the IP 
misappropriation problem. Thus information sharing precedes information leakage. We 
discuss this aspect in details below.  
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1.5 Knowledge Sharing by Principal  
Earlier, integrated circuit chip design companies used to be large and vertically 
integrated. Later they began to move chip manufacturing to offshore fabrication facilities 
(called “fabs”) that leveraged economies of scale to produce large volumes of chips for 
many chip companies. Thus the chip companies did not have to raise capital to establish 
their own manufacturing capabilities. Today, almost every U.S. chip company is 
“fabless”, meaning that they do not have manufacturing facilities. These companies 
design their semiconductor products and contract chip production from their designs to 
offshore fabrication facilities (Patel and Pais, 2004). Two things are noteworthy here. 
First, chip manufacturing is not a core competency of these companies and hence it is 
outsourced. On the other hand, chip design being a core competency for these companies 
is not outsourced. Although chips sold by Texas Instruments and its rivals are 
manufactured in the same foundries, the product differentiation can be attributed to chip 
design (Boehner, 2008). Second, the outsourcing arrangement requires the chip design 
companies share their proprietary technology with the fabrication facilities. This is an 
example of knowledge sharing by the principal.  
Likewise, in software development outsourcing, the principal needs to share 
critical information in the form of source codes with the agent. The vendor gets access to 
this IP in order to accomplish the outsourcing task. Similarly, companies selling 
electronic products need to share product designs and specifications with their agents. In 
both cases, the shared IP becomes vulnerable to supplier opportunism and 
misappropriation.  
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1.6 IP Theft by In-House Employees 
 It is important to note that the risk of IP theft is a not unique feature of 
outsourcing. In principle, employers can exercise higher control and monitoring to check 
for opportunistic behavior of their employees. Also, career concerns of employees may 
mitigate information leakage by in-house employees (Baccara, 2007). However, there 
are numerous instances where opportunistic in-house employees have tried to sell 
company IP to competitors. Interested readers may follow Rajan and Zingales (2001) to 
see how employees can leak information to rivals. Companies like Ford, Gillette, and 
Cargill have all faced this problem. The employees gain access to company IP and either 
sell the IP to a competitor, or take these IP with them when they join a competitor 
company.  
From the various examples cited above, it is evident that the problem of IP 
misappropriation is universal. Companies that outsource are aware of potential problems 
like counterfeit, knock-offs or third shift when they outsource production to contract 
manufacturers. Yet, they cannot ignore the benefits that outsourcing provides. As Rick 
Wagoner, CEO of GM remarks: 
“There is always risk when you’re investing in an emerging market. But the bigger risk 
is not being there” (Businessweek, 2004). 
 Given that most companies acknowledge the IP theft problem as inevitable, it is 
important for economists and practitioners to understand how firms protect their IP when 
they outsource supply chain activities to contractors. In the next section these strategies 
are discussed.  
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1.7 Strategies to Protect IP in Outsourcing 
 In order to protect their IP, companies have been using various kinds of 
protection mechanisms and strategies. The effectiveness and limitations of these 
approaches are discussed in the following sections. 
1.7.1 Legal Remedies 
 Legal tools like patents, trade secrets exist but often they are ineffective. It has 
long been known that patents do not work in practice as they do in theory (Teece, 1986).  
Moreover, IP laws vary across countries and enforcement is difficult. IP protection has 
remained an important policy issue between developed countries and developing 
countries where tasks are outsourced. While developed countries insist that developing 
countries must tighten their IP protection laws, the latter resist such pressures on the 
ground that IP protection is a means of rent transfer to developed countries (Markusen, 
2001).  
It is important to note that when companies outsource tasks to offshore locations, 
any kind of IP disputes are likely to be governed by the laws of the country where the 
supplier is located. The more severe problem with outsourcing is enforcement, especially 
when tasks are sent offshore. Due to inefficiencies in legal systems in offshore locations 
a company that is outsourcing to these locations may not expect significant monetary 
recovery.  
In spite of the problems with legal enforcement of contracts, it is advisable to 
write a proper contract to begin with. A Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA) is often a 
key step to protect IP shared in an outsourcing relationship. When the principal wants to 
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outsource production to a contract manufacturer, valuable information like product 
specifications should be shared only after signing a NDA. Also, when possible, the 
principal ought to apply for a patent. For example, in case of a medical device company, 
utility patents are most important form of IP protection. Utility patents protect the 
functional aspects of a technology like the components, composition of the device, 
manufacturing techniques and software processes. Another type of patent protection that 
is less costly and generally less useful is design patent. A design patent does not protect 
any functional aspect of the medical device but only covers the appearance. In certain 
countries outside U.S., protection of manufacturing designs may be obtained by using 
“utility designs” or “utility models.” These are cheaper than utility patents and offer 
weaker protection than utility patents (Chesser and Cohen, 2005). 
 Given the weak protection available through legal means, companies use a rich 
variety of strategies to combat the IP theft problem. These strategies are discussed below 
using real life examples in each case. The objective is to understand these strategies and 
examine their relative effectiveness in the analytical models presented in Chapter II and 
Chapter III. 
 
1.7.2 Limited Knowledge Sharing  
 Companies often use less than full information sharing strategy. In building the 
Boeing 777, both Boeing and outsourced Japanese engineers shared proprietary 
information. However, to deter espionage by the Japanese engineers, their access to 
Boeing’s secure areas was limited (Lewicki et al., 1998).  
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Secrecy is one of the ways that companies use to protect their IP while engaging  
with suppliers. Thus automobile manufacturers try to keep design and technology 
choices as trade secrets during the product development stage. As Novak and Stern 
(2009) point out, most product development for each system occurs within secured 
facilities and system-specific or even component-specific access codes are required to 
access specific areas or computer databases. In order to maintain trade secrecy, 
companies often need to limit coordination efforts across different components of 
automobile production.  
 
1.7.3 Modularization of Tasks 
 Task modularization is a useful strategy to secure IP from being misappropriated. 
Companies create sealed modules for selectively sharing their IP without exposing it too 
much. Then the companies send these modules to contract agents to perform the specific 
tasks. The modules give partners enough contexts for completing their specific task 
without revealing enough IP for duplicating designs or processes. For example, an 
automotive parts company wanted to cut the cost of developing sunroof product. Since 
creating CAD geometry for fitting sunroofs to car models was not a core competency of 
the company, it decided to outsource that task. The contractors had enough contexts to 
complete their tasks of modifying sunroof parts, but not enough for them to learn to 
duplicate the design without extraordinary effort (Brincheck, 2008). 
Tiwana et al. (2008) point out that Japanese companies consistently use 
modularization strategy to mitigate IP risk. They decompose an outsourced project into 
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smaller pieces and outsource the tasks to different vendors. The decomposition of tasks 
is done in such a way that only the client can assemble them back together. The authors 
argue that in contrast to Japanese manufacturers, most Western companies try to protect 
their IP through legal contracts, which are frequently unenforceable across national 
boundaries.  
HP outsources design of boards and systems from its electronic manufacturing 
services (EMS) partners, who are often recognized as contract design manufacturers 
(CDM). When HP outsources design from its CDM, it makes sure that its IP is protected. 
In particular, the CDM need to have separate labs for HP products (Carbone, 2007). 
Also, HP uses the threat of terminating business with a CDM if any IP is compromised. 
This strategy works well since agents do not want to lose HP as their key customer.  
Fine and Whitney (1996) explain how HP implemented successful outsourcing 
strategy and protected its IP while designing disk-drives. HP found that it would not be 
able to keep up with all the elements of disk drive technology. So it designed the disk 
operating system software, the read/write control system and contracted out the design to 
Citizen Watch to manufacture the disk drive. Each element in the product was made by a 
different company. Fine and Whitney (1996) argue that there were several factors that 
prevented Citizen from assembling the same set of suppliers and going into the disk 
drive business itself. HP's skill lies in the ability to forecast price and demand in the 
future and then to convert those requirements into engineering specifications. The two 
vital skills, market knowledge and system engineering were HP’s core competency. It 
would be hard for Citizen to replicate these core competencies and hence it never  
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emerged as a competitor of HP in disk drive business.  
Car manufacturers need to disclose their valuable IP (e.g. designs) with their 
external suppliers. Thus they face the risk of innovations being revealed to their 
competitors before vehicles are introduced in the market (Novak and Stern, 2009). In 
this case, a modular system can be beneficial in protecting IP. A design challenge in the 
luxury car market has been the integration of cellular phone subsystem into the audio 
system. If these were integrated design then the cellular phone would share a circuit 
board and control panel with the audio system. In contrast, a modular design would 
allow the cell phone’s circuit to be separate from the audio system. Thus design 
modularity can facilitate outsourcing of cellular phone components with little overlap 
between manufacturer and the supplier during product development. Instead, an 
integrated design would require extensive disclosure of designs to the phone supplier. 
For example, an integrated design would reveal to the supplier whether a global 
positioning system (GPS) was also included, while a modular design can avoid this 
disclosure.  
 
1.7.4 Technological Solution  
 One effective way of protecting IP while outsourcing is to use technological 
solutions. For instance, advanced encryption, watermarking, digital rights management 
(DRM) technologies provide inexpensive ways to protect IP. Consider the example of 
PTC, a provider of product development software. It incorporated protective measures in 
its software that would prevent IP theft during design collaboration. When designers 
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share product data with suppliers, they can de-feature the product models. This enables 
that only the needed data is shared with the suppliers (Teresko, 2008). Often companies 
differentiate products buy using authenticity measures. Anheuser Busch was facing the 
problem of counterfeit Budweiser beer products in China. The company started 
importing unique foil (that turns red when cold) for packaging which is difficult for 
counterfeiters to obtain (Businessweek, 2005b). 
 
1.7.5 Demand-side Strategies  
  In addition to the supply side strategies of managing the agent or modularizing  
the architecture of the tasks, there is another useful strategy that companies use to protect  
their IP. Product differentiation is one such effective strategy. If there is IP theft, the  
competing products will have similar features. If the products are too similar, then the  
consumers will prefer the one that is cheaper. Therefore a company must ensure that its  
product has certain unique features or services that are valuable to the customers.  
Providing complementary services like product support can be used to introduce a  
switching cost among the customers. To the extent that customers value the service  
provided by the company, they will be reluctant to switch to competing products.  
Companies have often bundled their products with customer services and hence, if the  
customer is purchasing counterfeit products then she would not get the valuable service.  
Microsoft, for instance, provides regular product updates to genuine software owners.  
Pirated software owners do not get this service. Thus we see how product features and/or  
services may be used to deter sale of pirated products.  
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The above cases illustrate that companies resort to different kind of strategies in 
order to protect their IP while engaging in outsourcing. Companies willing to outsource 
should assess the relative costs and benefits of these alternative solutions.  
 
1.7.6 What (not) to Outsource? 
 “We will push some product development projects to India and China, but the 
lion's share will stay where it is.”- Bill Gates (CNET News, 2004).  
The existing literature contends that companies must keep core competency tasks 
in-house and not outsource them (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Lacity and Willcocks, 
1998).Thus it is important to identify the core competencies in the first place. Core 
competencies are the tasks that a firm can do better than others. Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990) suggest several tests to identify whether a task is core competency or not. A core 
competency should provide potential access to a wide variety of markets, a significant 
contribution to the perceived customer benefits and must be difficult for competitors to 
imitate. These tasks are also sources of comparative advantage to the firm. Examples of 
core competencies are ‘miniaturization’ at Sony, ‘small engine design and manufacture’ 
at Honda, ‘measurement technology’ at HP (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
Clemons and Hitt (2004) provide valuable insight on how to decide which 
activities to outsource and which to keep with the firm. According to their suggestion, a 
risk based screening must be done for each of the candidate tasks. Once the risks are 
listed, the management needs to see if these risks are manageable by designing contract. 
The authors suggest that a firm should consider keeping an activity in-house if the size 
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of the expected economic loss that can result from an outsourcing contract exceeds the 
expected economic gains. We can apply this logic to explain why firms prefer to do 
certain tasks in-house even if it is costlier to do so. For example, why did Apple design 
in-house the dual core processor for its tablets? The expected benefits of outsourcing this 
task would have been lower than the expected loss from losing the IP. Likewise, several 
food manufacturing companies use strategies to protect their IP as “secret sauce”, Cisco 
Systems retains in-house manufacturing for its cutting edge routers (Arruñada and 
Vázquez, 2006) and so on.  
Azoulay (2004) finds that pharmaceutical firms are more likely to outsource the 
coordination of data-intensive clinical trials, while they are more likely to assign 
knowledge-intensive trials to internal teams. However, recently pharmaceutical 
companies outsource biostatistics in clinical trials to CRO. This exemplifies the need to 
access special expertise that is not available in-house. However, as Mehta and Peters 
(2007) explain, an accumulation of critical resources and tacit knowledge could allow 
the CRO to emerge as an independent competitive player in the drug development 
business. Thus, pharmaceutical companies should carefully assess whether they need to 
outsource critical tasks to CRO.  
 
1.8 Existing Literature on Protection of IP in Outsourcing  
 Since almost any task can be done in-house or outsourced, a natural question 
arises: When does a firm outsource certain task? A brief review of the transaction cost 
and property rights theory is warranted to understand the “make or buy/outsource” 
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decision of a firm. These theories help us understand whether a firm should do a task 
within its own organization or outsource it from the market/independent supplier.  
There are transaction costs in both kinds of arrangements, as pointed out by 
Coase (1937). The market mechanism entails certain costs: discovering the relevant 
prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur 
may be able to reduce these “transaction costs” by coordinating these activities himself. 
However, internal organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely problems 
of weak incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation (Klein, 2005). As Grossman 
and Helpman (2002) point out, if tasks are done in-house, then firms face relatively high 
fixed and variable production costs due to their lack of complete specialization and the 
extra governance costs. Therefore, the decision between “make or buy” would depend 
on the relative costs of organizing the task using the two alternative approaches. A task 
will be outsourced if the relative cost of outsourcing is less than that of in-house 
organization. But the benefits of outsourcing come with the drawbacks of incomplete 
contracts. If there are concerns with IP protection then transaction cost will increase in 
outsourcing and therefore a firm will tend to choose in-house approach to do the task.  
The theory of property rights suggests that transaction costs depend on allocation 
of property rights. If property rights can reduce transaction costs of outsourcing relative 
to the cost of performing the task in-house then the task will be outsourced. Aghion and 
Tirole (1994) analyzed optimal allocation of property rights on innovation between a 
firm and an innovator. If the innovator’s effort is “important enough” then they suggest 
that control should be allocated to the innovator.  If there is potential for opportunism by 
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the agent, the Property Rights approach suggests that residual rights may be given to the 
agent (Ramello, 2005).  
It is important to specify all IP related issues in outsourcing contracts. However, 
contracts are inherently incomplete (Williamson, 1975, Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart 
and Moore 1990). It is impossible to specify all future contingencies in a contract. 
Existing literature talks about three classic types of risk associated with outsourcing and 
inter-firm activities: shirking, poaching and opportunistic renegotiation. Given the 
objective of this dissertation, we focus on IP risk or poaching. After a contract has been 
signed, and relationship specific investments have been sunk, the agent may behave 
opportunistically (Ramello, 2005). The Transaction Cost Economics says that this type 
of ex-post opportunistic behavior leads to contractual hazards and hold-up problem 
which increase the transaction costs of outsourcing (Coase, 1937, Klein et al., 1978, 
Williamson, 1975). There are two kinds of solutions to this contractual hazard/ hold-up 
problem. The property rights theory of firm developed by Grossman-Hart-Moore says 
that hold up problem can be solved by properly allocating the property rights between 
the parties. Thus one way to solve the hold up problem is to organize the task in-house 
i.e. vertically integrating with the supplier. As Hart and Moore (1990) remark, 
integration is a way to reduce the opportunistic behavior and holdup problems. Another 
solution is to use contractual safeguards like restrictive covenants, penalty for breach of 
contract and using incentive payments. Indeed, firms extensively use contractual 
methods to mitigate IP risk in outsourcing contracts (Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009b). 
However, as Majewski and Williamson (2004) argue, in a weak IP regime, the solution 
 32 
of allocating property rights may not work and there is a possibility of IP 
misappropriation. In addition, the property rights approach says that the rights should be 
given to the party whose investment matters most for the project. In practical terms, this 
assessment can be difficult, if not impossible. Finally, the usage of contractual 
safeguards as a way to solve the hold-up problem depends on the enforceability of 
contracts. As we have seen in many the real life cases, legal enforcement of contracts 
can be daunting task in outsourcing. This calls for alternative mechanisms to protect IP 
while engaging in outsourcing. A review of the existing literature provides the following 
suggestions on how to protect IP while outsourcing.  
Ulset (1996) acknowledges the problem of supplier opportunism in R&D 
outsourcing through leakage of technology. He suggests that internal organization should 
be used to manage core R&D projects; outsourcing may be used for small, 
complementary projects and to tap external resources. He argues while IP laws provide 
weak protection against technology leakage, contractual laws might be more effective in 
deterring leakage. When R&D is outsourced, transaction costs will arise due to project 
uncertainties, bounded rationality, opportunism and non-redeployable efforts 
(Williamson, 1991). Contractual safeguards are needed to reduce these transaction costs 
in outsourcing. In order to avoid technology leakage problem, the client must use 
stronger rights to control the R&D process of the supplier. Contractual safeguards need 
to be used to prevent the supplier from leaking R&D results to competitors. Therefore, 
when designing the contracts, firms should use controls as well as high powered  
incentives to manage outsourced projects.   
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Future business prospects may also deter IP leakage problem (Ulset, 1996). As 
Arruñada and Vázquez (2006) point out, a long term contract can hinder a CM from 
abandoning the OEM. Long term contracts are commonly used in clinical delivery 
alliances, where CRO receives incentive payments in terms of milestone based payments 
and royalties. These are also extensively used by Japanese car manufacturers 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Taylor and Wiggins, 1997).  
Lai et al. (2009) assumes that leakage of information will reduce R&D firm’s 
market share. They find that the mode of compensation plays an important role in 
deterring IP theft. In particular, a revenue sharing scheme is more effective than a fixed 
fee scheme in protecting IP. 
Ho (2009) examined R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, 
who can leak information to a rival firm. Due to the possibility of information leakage in 
the interim stage, there will be increased competition between the original firm and the 
rival firm. This will push up the compensation to the supplier. Thus the principal may 
not be able to write a profitable contract. However, if the firm hires two contractors, then 
allowing for competition between them along with a non disclosure punishment can 
alleviate the problem of information leakage. Ho’s solution essentially relies on non-
disclosure agreement and competition between the suppliers.  
Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a) examine IT outsourcing contracts and find that 
companies use incentive mechanisms and modular design of outsourced tasks to mitigate 
IP risk. Companies typically use two contractual approaches to safeguard against 
opportunistic behavior of suppliers: IPR-sharing and restrictive covenants. Companies 
 34 
use non-compete clauses in order to prohibit a partner from contracting with a third party 
or developing the same technology outside of the current contract.  
It is noteworthy that some researchers argue that if a firm is concerned about 
protection of IP, then the task should be done in-house. This argument is based on the 
assumption that in-house employees will not misappropriate IP. This is possible when 
in-house employees have prospect of promotion (Baccara, 2007) or when they receive a 
loyalty premium over the market wage (Lai et al., 2009).  However, this assumption may 
be questionable since in-house employees could also behave opportunistically. This 
possibility was addressed by Ziegler (1985), Rajan and Zingales (2001) among others. 
Finally, there are some authors who acknowledge the problem of IP leakage in 
outsourcing. These papers provide insight on effects of IP leakage on the market for 
information (e.g. Baccarra, 2007), innovation and relative wages in a North-South trade 
model (e.g. Glass, 2004) but do not provide suggestion on how to protect IP while 
outsourcing.  
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It can be said that the existing literature confines attention to the supply side of 
the problem, i.e. how to manage the agent using various kinds of mechanisms. The 
supplier management solutions may be broadly classified into the following categories.  
a) Compensation: The agent must be paid incentive payments. 
b) Rules: Contracts should be written with safeguards like non-compete/ exclusivity 
clauses and restrictive covenants (e.g. Non Disclosure Agreement).  
c) Modularization: Break the outsourcing tasks into smaller modules and outsource them 
to different suppliers.  
d) Length of contracts: Long term contracts are also useful to deter short term 
opportunistic behavior. The extant literature is summarized in Table 3.  
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Table 3.  Contributions of Existing Literature on IP Protection in Outsourcing 
 
Author(s) 
 
Research question Principal (P) 
and 
Agent (A) 
Type of IP 
and motivation 
to outsource 
Mechanism of 
IP leakage 
Problems 
Acknowledged 
Solutions offered Limitation 
Ulset  
1996  
1. What affects the 
choice between 
outsourcing and in-
house R&D 
(Boundary) 
2. If  R&D 
outsourcing is 
chosen then how to 
govern it? 
(Governance) 
P: Private 
manufacturing 
firms in R&D 
intensive industry  
(IT) 
 
A: Universities and 
R&D companies 
Foreground IP 
 
Tap advanced 
knowledge and 
technology 
After end of 
project, the A 
can sell modified 
copies of R&D 
output to 
competitors 
1. Loss of control 
2. Technology leakage  
3. Creation of bilateral 
monopoly over time  
1. Internal organization 
to conduct core projects, 
Outsource 
complementary small 
project and tapping 
external knowhow. 
2. Hybrid contracts: 
Control over supplier’s 
production and give 
supplier some property 
rights on R&D output. 
3. Exclusivity clauses in 
R&D contracts 
No knowledge 
sharing between P 
and A.  
 
Control over 
supplier’s 
production 
requires high 
coordination costs. 
 
Enforceability of 
contracts is often 
absent. 
Mehta and 
Peters  
2007 
problem faced by 
pharmaceutical 
companies when 
they are outsourcing 
core activities like 
R&D 
P: Pharmaceutical 
companies  
 
A: Contract 
Research 
Organization  
Type of work: 
Biostatistics, 
clinical trials  
Background IP 
       
Motivation: 
Reduce cost and 
time of bringing 
products to the 
market 
Extensive 
knowledge 
sharing by P 
Knowledge sharing can lead 
to emergence of 
independent competing 
firms  
Bring tasks in-house if 
IP is a concern  
Does not provide 
solution on how to 
protect IP within 
outsourcing 
relationship.  
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Table 3 Continued 
Author(s) 
 
Research question Principal (P) 
and 
Agent (A) 
Type of IP 
and motivation to 
outsource 
Mechanism of IP 
leakage 
Problems 
Acknowledged 
Solutions offered Limitation 
Baccara  
2007 
What is the effect of 
R&D outsourcing 
on the market for 
information 
P: Firms in 
Management 
consulting industry  
(Monopolistic 
competitive market) 
 
A: Contractor 
Background IP Contractor learns 
the R&D 
developed by the 
firm as a 
byproduct of 
main task. 
Unintentional 
spillover of 
knowledge by A 
or 
A sells 
information to 
competitors 
Contractors learn the clients’ 
technology and then diffuse 
it to competitors 
No suggestion on IP 
protection 
 
A perfectly learns 
the cost-cutting 
technology 
developed by the 
P, 
No uncertainty. 
Lai et al.       
2009 
Choice of payment 
mechanism- 
lumpsum contract 
vs. revenue sharing 
contract   
P: owner of 
production firm 
 
A: research firm  
Foreground IP 
 
Information 
sharing between 
partners facilitate 
leakage 
 1. A fixed pay cannot 
deter IP theft, Revenue 
sharing mechanism can 
do so. 
2. While outsourcing 
might be efficient, it 
might not be chosen 
because of the potential 
information leakage 
problem 
3. A strengthening of IP 
system may not induce 
more R&D outsourcing 
as it might favor more 
in-house R&D due to 
increased length product 
cycle. 
No uncertainty.   
The paper does not 
address how the 
information gets 
leaked.  
The principal 
continues 
outsourcing from 
the agent even 
after IP theft 
occurs.  
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Table 3 Continued 
Author(s) 
 
Research question Principal (P) 
and 
Agent (A) 
Type of IP 
and motivation to 
outsource 
Mechanism of IP 
leakage 
Problems 
Acknowledged 
Solutions offered Limitation 
Ho  
2009 
Protection of IP in 
R&D outsourcing 
with possibility of 
leakage of 
information. 
P: Firm  
 
A: Contractor 
Foreground IP 
 
R&D is  
Process 
innovation            
 
A sells the R&D 
to a rival firm 
There is asymmetric 
information between P and 
A with respect to R&D 
outcome 
1. A profitable leakage 
free contract does not 
exist because of the 
competition among the 
original client and its 
rival firm and increased 
bargaining power of the 
contractor. 
2. When there are two 
contractors, a relative 
performance scheme 
along with a disclosure 
punishment could 
mitigate the problem of 
information leakage. 
1. IP leakage 
cannot be 
prevented with one 
Agent. 
2. With two 
agents, the 
solution depends 
on disclosure 
punishment, i.e. 
legal tool and 
enforceability  
3. Competing 
firms produce 
homogeneous  
products 
Chen and 
Bhardwaj  
2009a 
Empirical analysis 
on determinants of 
contract structure. 
How contracts are 
used to protect IP. 
P: IT firms  
 
A: outsourcing 
firms  
 
Task: Outsourcing 
of software 
development  
   Two IP protection 
mechanisms 
employed by firms are  
a) IPR sharing 
arrangements and b) 
restrictive covenants 
Solutions depend 
on enforceability 
of contracts  
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1.9 Limitations of the Existing Literature 
 The limitations of the existing literature are noteworthy in the light of the various 
real life examples enumerated earlier in section 1.4.3.  
i) The extant literature does not consider explicitly the role of knowledge sharing 
by the principal. This is contrary to the real life examples described earlier. 
ii) Most papers address the problem of protecting IP that is created within an 
outsourcing relationship (for instance, Lai et al., 2009, Ho, 2009). However, in 
many of the real life cases, we found that the principal typically shared their pre-
existing IP with the agent, which eventually was misappropriated. The two 
papers that address the pre-existing IP are Baccara (2007) and Mehta and Peters 
(2007). While Baccara explains the effect of IP leakage on the market for 
information, no suggestion is offered on how to protect IP. Mehta and Peters 
(2007) on the other hand suggests that core competency tasks should be 
performed in-house to protect the IP. Thus the literature does not offer any 
suggestion on how to protect pre-existing IP of the principal.  
iii) The literature does not provide any solution on how to mitigate the two agency 
problems related to IP misappropriation and shirking behavior by the agent.  
iv) The solutions offered by the existing literature deals only with the supply side of     
the problem, i.e. how to manage the agent.  
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1.10 Contributions of Dissertation  
 This dissertation contributes to the literature by tackling the three omissions 
mentioned above in section 1.9.  First, it is argued that information or knowledge sharing 
is a key source of the IP misappropriation problem occurring in outsourcing. As will be 
demonstrated later, the principal can strategically use this knowledge sharing to deter 
opportunistic behavior by the agent. In particular, by sharing less knowledge, the 
principal can reduce the agent’s willingness to walk away from the project. This, along 
with sufficient incentive payments can deter the two agency problems due to IP theft and 
shirking behavior by the agent. 
Second, the case where the principal shares its pre-existing IP with the agent is 
considered. Post knowledge sharing, the agent might walk away with information and 
set up an independent competing firm. This approach is close to most of the real cases.  
Third, it is argued that companies contemplating to outsource should develop 
complementary strategies to deter the IP misappropriation problem. Traditionally, 
researchers have looked into the supplier management strategies like higher efficiency 
wages and contractual clauses. However, from the real life cases of IP disputes in 
outsourcing, it is possible to argue that only supply side management strategies would 
provide incomplete protection. Companies should use strategic safeguards like less 
knowledge sharing, product differentiation and modularization, as well as contractual 
safeguards like incentive payments and penalties in order to prevent IP misappropriation 
while outsourcing. 
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CHAPTER II 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT OUTSOURCING 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Maintaining ownership in all aspects of a vertically integrated business can be 
very costly. As a result, entrepreneurs are increasingly finding it profitable to outsource 
some non-core activities outside their own boundaries. Until recently, core activities like 
R&D were looked upon as sacrosanct areas which management preferred to keep in-
house. However, perceptions are changing these days and companies are looking to 
outsource even R&D. For instance, the drug development industry is an emerging area 
of entrepreneurship where tasks are extensively outsourced to specialized contract 
research organizations. Likewise, start-up software entrepreneurs routinely outsource 
development and debugging tasks to contract agents. Evidently, outsourcing R&D is 
becoming a strategic tool for companies. This contention is supported by the National 
Science Foundation (2010) finding that in 2007, companies in the United States (U.S.) 
contracted-out $19 billion worth of R&D to other organizations in the U.S. Over the 
time period 1993-2007, while the growth rate of in-house R&D was 1.6%, the same for 
contracted out R&D was 4.5%.   
However, lately entrepreneurs are realizing that management of IP in outsourcing 
relationships can be a daunting task. A survey conducted by R&D Magazine (2007) cites 
IP protection as the main reason firms did not outsource R&D. For an entrepreneur, IP is 
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often the most important asset. As Rajan and Zingales (2001) note, entrepreneurs with 
unique, critical ideas and superior management techniques form the basis of surplus 
generating enterprises. If IP can be easily misappropriated, the ability of entrepreneurs to 
generate rents from proprietary knowledge becomes limited. This paper aims to provide 
strategies for entrepreneurs to protect their IP while outsourcing R&D when contract 
enforcement may be costly or impossible.  
With outsourcing’s allure and risks, contractual relationships are gaining 
increasing importance.  As entrepreneurs are outsourcing R&D work to contract agents, 
two questions arise: why do they outsource, and if they outsource, what strategies might 
be used to protect IP from misappropriation? The ‘why’ part of the question is attributed 
largely to cost savings offered by outsourcing and access to external specialized 
expertise. For example, it was estimated that the U.S. information technology (IT) 
industry would save $390 billion in 2010 through offshore outsourcing of software 
development (McKinsey Global Institute, 2003). The second question requires a more 
careful examination and is the subject of this chapter. As rightly pointed out by Ho 
(2009), although some governments are implementing new laws in an effort to become 
credible offshore outsourcing destinations, the problem of enforcement still prevails. 
Therefore, outsourcing of R&D in the presence of inadequate IP protection is a paradox 
and remains an interesting research area.  
  Several examples involving IP misappropriation in outsourcing engagements 
have been described in Chapter I. These cases share some common features. An 
entrepreneur (principal) shares proprietary knowledge and trade secrets with an 
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outsourcing partner (agent) to benefit through collaboration. Critical information is 
shared by the principal in order to facilitate the tasks of the agent. Finally, the shared 
information is misappropriated either directly by the outsourcing partner through 
creation of competing products or indirectly through employee theft that may be the 
result of inadequate contract employee screening and oversight.  The question arises: if 
there is a possibility of eventual misappropriation of IP shared in an outsourcing 
relationship, how might entrepreneurs share their knowledge in a way to achieve the 
benefits from outsourcing while at the same time reducing the risk of misappropriation 
of knowledge? Further, what economic factors determine how much knowledge should 
be shared? Admittedly, legal tools like patents and copyrights do exist, but the problem 
of weak enforceability can make them ineffective. Our objective is to design an 
outsourcing contract mechanism and complementary strategies that might enable 
entrepreneurs to protect their existing IP. This can be achieved through well aligned 
incentives so that the benefits of outsourcing might be obtained while reducing the 
likelihood of needing to enforce ownership through legal proceedings. 
 
2.2 Related Literature  
Relatively few researchers have dealt with the problem of IP protection in 
outsourcing. Although the problem has been acknowledged in the literature (Arruñada 
and Vázquez, 2006; Baccara, 2007), effective solutions have been scarcely offered. 
Legal tools like patents and trade secrets exist, but enforcement problems remain. 
Especially when tasks are outsourced to offshore locations, IP litigation gets further 
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complicated due to differential laws across countries (Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009a). The 
extant literature provides the following suggestions on how to protect IP in outsourcing 
engagements. 
Opportunistic behavior by an R&D supplier (agent) may be reduced by aligning 
the compensation structure with the objectives of the entrepreneur (principal). Ulset 
(1996) suggests that contractual safeguards be used to reduce transaction costs of 
outsourcing. To prevent technology leakage, a client should contractually secure 
stronger rights to control the supplier’s R&D production process and exclude others 
from using the resultant R&D output. Ulset (1996) argues that contractual controls along 
with high powered incentives would lead to efficient provision of R&D. Lai et al. (2009) 
find that a revenue or gain sharing contract might be more useful in protecting IP 
compared to a lump-sum payment often used in real-world contracts for outsourced 
R&D. Ho (2009) finds that when a firm outsources R&D to a single contractor, the latter 
can leak R&D results to a competitor. In Ho’s model, both the client and competitor 
compete to obtain the R&D results, and hence push up payments to the contractor.  As a 
result, payments to the contractor might be so high that a profitable contract may not be 
possible for the client. However, she finds that when there are two contractors, a relative 
performance scheme along with a disclosure penalty can mitigate information leakage. 
However, the relative performance contract relies on the ability of the principal to 
enforce a disclosure penalty, which may be difficult in many situations. Chen and 
Bharadwaj (2009a) find that IT firms often use incentive mechanisms, including rights 
sharing and restrictive covenants, to mitigate IP theft risks in software outsourcing  
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contracts. 
When there is a possibility that the agent can misappropriate IP, some authors 
suggest that a long-term (infinitely repeated play) contract may be a viable remedy for 
the problem (Ulset, 1996). This line of research stems from the successful long term 
contracts prevalent in the Japanese auto industry (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Taylor 
and Wiggins, 1997).  In contrast, we focus on limited duration (one-shot stage-game) 
contracts that might be used when outsourcing R&D for developing a new product.  
 Our study contributes to the literature along several important dimensions. In the 
light of the IP theft cases enumerated in Chapter I, we identify important missing 
elements in the existing literature which are addressed in this chapter. First, the literature 
(e.g. Baccara, 2007; Lai et al., 2009, and Ho, 2009) bypasses the knowledge sharing and 
learning mechanism that allows an agent to understand the principal’s IP sufficiently 
well to use the technology towards its own benefit. We consider the complexity and 
costliness of this learning process as a vital element of the IP misappropriation problem 
and explicitly incorporate a learning effect by the agent in our model.  Further, in our 
model, information leakage is not due to an unintended spillover occurring from the 
principal to the agent. Rather, the agent makes a strategic decision on whether to 
abandon the contract by misappropriating the knowledge or continue with the current 
contractual relationship.  
 Second, previous works typically address the problem as an agent 
misappropriating IP and eventually selling it to a competitor of the client firm (e.g. Lai et 
al., 2009; Ho, 2009). In contrast, we consider the possibility of an agent emerging as a 
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direct competitor of the entrepreneur firm. This prospect could arise when the agent gets 
access to critical production knowledge (Prahalad, 1990). Our approach is corroborated 
by the pharmaceutical, biotech, automotive, footwear and semiconductor industries 
where contract manufacturers have often emerged as direct rivals of their clients. 
Accumulation of critical know-how and tacit knowledge might enable contract agents to 
emerge as competitors of software start-ups; or a contract manufacturer could emerge as 
direct competitor of an original equipment manufacturer (Arruñada and Vázquez, 2006). 
Third, the literature does not distinguish between protection of pre-existing IP of 
an entrepreneur and protection of IP produced in an outsourcing relationship. This 
dissertation is specifically intended for protection of pre-existing IP of a firm as appears 
was the case in several of the examples enumerated in Chapter I. 
 In what follows, we develop an optimal contract under the possibility of IP theft. 
We also discuss several complementary strategies that might be used in conjunction with 
an appropriately designed contract to reduce the agent’s incentive for misappropriating 
IP in an outsourcing relationship. We consider an outsourcing contract between an 
entrepreneur (principal) and a R&D contractor (agent), most often thought of as a 
contract research organization, contractor, supplier, or vendor. A stage game is 
developed where the principal delegates R&D to the agent through a contract. If the 
agent accepts the contract, the principal disseminates its pre-existing IP for the purpose 
of the project. The pre-existing IP is the know-how that the entrepreneur has already 
developed by incurring substantial cost. After knowledge is shared by the principal, the 
agent exerts effort which affects the quality of R&D produced. Knowledge sharing could 
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potentially reduce the agent’s cost of exerting effort through a learning effect, so much 
so that it becomes profitable to walk away from the contract and establish a rival 
product. The objective of the principal is to design an incentive compatible contract such 
that it is optimal for the agent not to misuse the knowledge as well as exert effort on the 
project. We contrast this case with the situation where the entrepreneur does not have the 
possibility of IP theft when a technological solution is available. 
We obtain several interesting results from this model. The principal must share a 
level of knowledge that is just sufficient for the agent to perform the task. This may be 
accomplished through modularization of tasks. The level of knowledge shared under the 
possibility of IP theft is shown to be less than what would have been shared when IP 
theft is not feasible. While less than optimal knowledge sharing comprises the stick 
approach, the principal has to provide enough carrots too, such that the agent stays with 
the contract and exerts high effort on the R&D project. The principal achieves this by 
designing an incentive compatible contract that ensures a profit of the agent equal to his 
“outside option” which we define as profits from selling a differentiated rival product. 
This will keep the agent from misappropriating the principal’s IP and also induce 
optimal effort exertion. 
At this point we enumerate some of the managerial implications of our findings. 
Contractual performance incentives could work favorably given the two agency 
problems. For instance, contractors often receive bonuses when they exceed service level 
agreement (SLA) performance targets. The contractual payments must be as large as the 
outside option that the agent could have earned by selling a competing product. In 
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addition to the carrot and stick mechanism, we find that firms might use complementary 
strategies like product differentiation and/or task modularization to protect their IP.  
 
2.3 A Model  
 The basic issue is how best to delegate a task which is either too complex or too 
costly for a firm to do on its own. The theory of incentives is used to address the two 
problems due to shirking and IP misappropriation by the contractor. We develop a model 
where an entrepreneur signs a contract with an agent to organize and produce R&D.  In 
the first stage, the principal offers a R&D contract to the agent. If the agent accepts the 
contract, the principal decides how much knowledge to share with the agent. Firms 
typically possess a portfolio of IP comprised of technological know-how, software, 
database, process or manufacturing knowledge, and trade secrets. The agent gets access 
to some or all of these in order to complete the outsourcing task. For instance, 
automobile manufacturers share design information with their component suppliers to 
reduce production cost. Likewise, in software development tasks, the principal must 
share critical information in the form of source codes with the agent. Let KP denote the 
amount of knowledge shared by the principal. Since R&D tasks are inherently risky and 
the agent can only be imperfectly monitored, the principal is most likely to face post-
contractual opportunism problems emanating from choice of effort and IP theft by the 
agent.  
 In the intermediate stage, the agent decides whether to abrogate the contract and 
set up an independent rival firm.  
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In the second stage the agent decides on the level of effort, ]1,0[∈e to expend in 
developing the R&D. Higher effort is assumed to increase the probability that R&D has 
more desirable characteristics and higher value for the entrepreneur. The probability of 
realizing high quality, high value R&D v is ( )p e ; that of realizing low quality, low value 
R&D v  is ( )ep−1 . We specify ( ) eep = , so that the probability of getting high quality 
R&D is equal to the level of effort exerted by the agent. One could interpret these high 
(low) quality levels as outcomes of the project when it is a blockbuster (flop). 
In the final stage, if the agent does not steal the principal’s IP and continues work 
within the contract, either high or low quality R&D is realized and payments are made 
according to contract terms. However, if the agent copies the technology and establishes 
a competing product, the contract fails and the two firms play a duopoly game.  The 
sequence of actions by the two players is as follows. 
Time 0: Principal decides to outsource R&D from the agent and offers 
contract ( ) ( ){ }TvTv ,,, . Payment to the agent is high ( T ) or low (T ) if quality of R&D is 
high ( v ) or low (v ), respectively. We assume TTandvv >> . The agent accepts or 
rejects the contract.  
Time 1: If the agent accepts the contract, the principal chooses how much of existing IP 
to share (KP). The agent decides on whether to continue with the project or abrogate and 
establish an independent rival product.  
Time 2: The agent decides on level of effort, ]1,0[∈e . 
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R&D quality is realized: 



−
= )(1
)(
epyprobabilitwithv
epyprobabilitwithv
v  
Time 3: If the agent fulfils the contract, payments are made according to realized R&D 
level and contract terms. If agent abrogates the contract and produces a rival product, 
then the two competing firms play a duopoly game. 
 We assume both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. This assumption is 
consistent with the notion that both the principal and the agent are firms managed by 
executives seeking to maximize expected profits. The profit of the principal from the 
contract when the agent does not misappropriate IP is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2
2
1 PP KTvepTvep
γ
pi −−⋅−+−⋅=       (2.1) 
where γ >0. The profit of the agent from the contract is 
( ) ( )( ) contractAA CTepTep −⋅−+⋅= 1pi        (2.2) 
where contractAC  denotes the cost of the agent if he stays with the contract. The 
components of the cost function are described shortly. 
The goal of the principal is to design an incentive compatible contract such that 
the agent would not misappropriate the IP as well as exert high effort on the project. In 
order to do so, the principal must give the agent, in expected terms, a transfer that is at 
least equal to the outside option, Ψ. This outside option is computed as the duopoly 
profit the agent might earn, if he walks away from the contractual relationship and 
produces a competing product with stolen IP. In order to derive this outside option, we 
first specify how knowledge transfer occurs from the principal to the agent.  
  
51 
Knowledge sharing is modeled following an adapted version of D'Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988). The agent’s cost of production depends on the intensity with which 
he can assimilate the knowledge shared by the principal. The intensity of imitation is 
captured by parameter ]1,0[∈α . Formally, we specify the agent’s cost function under 
piracy as 
P
piracy
A KcC ⋅−= α          (2.3) 
where c denotes the marginal cost of production and α is the knowledge assimilation 
parameter that denotes the unit cost savings associated with knowledge transferred from 
the principal to the agent. In this chapter, sharing of proprietary knowledge by the 
principal leads to reduced cost of production for the agent. Thus when knowledge is 
misappropriated, both the principal and the agent have the same know-how to produce 
competing products as illustrated in the GM-Chery example, where both cars appear to 
share similar mathematical formulae and design (Liu and Fernandez, 2007). However, 
doing R&D for the principal entails an additional effort through increased 
communication and coordination (of supply chain related) activities and hence, higher 
cost for the agent. In particular, let the disutility of effort be given by a convex cost 
function ( ) 2eeg = . Thus, working for the principal renders the agent’s cost function as  
( )egKcC PcontractA +⋅−= α .         (2.4)  
We use backward induction to obtain the Bayes-perfect equilibrium of this game.  
Stage three 
If there is no IP theft, the agent fulfills the contract and R&D is realized according to 
exerted level of effort. Contingent on the realized quality of R&D the principal makes 
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payment to the agent. The profits of the principal and the agent are specified in (2.1) and 
(2.2) respectively. Instead, if the agent abrogates, the firms compete non-cooperatively 
in the product market. In this case, assuming that the agent cannot successfully replicate 
the principal’s brand, each company produces a differentiated product. We assume 
consumer demand for each product is given by 
jii qqw θ−−= 1          (2.5) 
where i, j =principal, agent and i ≠ j. w’s  and q’s denote prices charged and quantities 
produced. The parameter ]1,0[∈θ  captures the degree of substitutability between the 
competing products produced by the two firms when the agent misappropriates the 
principal’s IP and establishes a rival product. If θ is close to unity then the products are 
near perfect substitutes, whereas if it is zero, there is no substitutability between the 
products. Thus, when IP is misappropriated by the agent, the profit functions of the two 
firms are given by 
( ) 2
2
1 PPPAP
piracy
P KqCqq
γθpi −−−−=          (2.6a) 
and  
( ) ApiracyAPApiracyA qCqq −−−= θpi 1        (2.6b) 
where P
piracy
AP KcCcC ⋅−=≥= α . Since IP is shared by the principal, the agent gets 
costless access to the knowledge. The principal, on the other hand, had to invest 
substantial time and money in developing IP. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the 
two competing firms would have different costs of production. This may have been the 
case in the GM-Chery example. The R&D required by GM to produce Spark took 40 
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months, while Chery was able to develop similar technology to produce the QQ in only 
24 months (Liu and Fernandez, 2007). This suggests the cost of development for the QQ 
was less than that of Spark. Also, for simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur cannot 
obtain any indemnity from the agent. This simplifying assumption may be attributed to 
the fact that legal protection is imperfect (Rønde, 2001). It is straightforward to include 
an expected damage parameter in the profit functions above. However, the equilibrium 
conditions would not change. 
 When the agent decides to establish an independent rival product, the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium quantities are obtained by solving 0=
∂
∂
A
piracy
A
q
pi
and 0=
∂
∂
P
piracy
P
q
pi
: 
( ) ( )
24
112
θ
αθ
−
⋅+−⋅−−⋅
=
P
P
Kcc
q ,       (2.7) 
( ) ( )
24
112
θ
θα
−
−⋅−⋅+−⋅
=
cKc
q PA  .       (2.8) 
 
Lemma 2.1  
The agent can successfully establish a rival product and produce profitable positive 
output when PK
cc
>
+−−
θα
θθ22
. This may be interpreted as an upper bound on the 
level of knowledge shared by the principal to prevent the agent from producing a rival 
product. 
Proof: From equation (2.7), 0>Pq when PKcc θαθθ >+−− 22 and from (2.8), 0>Aq  
when PKcc αθθ 222 −>+−− . We combine these two inequalities as 
{ } PPP KKKMaxcc θααθαθθ =−>+−− 2,22 . This proves Lemma 2.1. 
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Substituting the quantities from (2.7) and (2.8) into the profit functions (2.6a) and (2.6b) 
yields the equilibrium profit levels in terms of the principal’s first stage choice variable, 
KP : 
( ) 22
2 24
22
P
Ppiracy
P K
Kcc γ
θ
αθθ
pi −





−
⋅−⋅+−−
=  and      (2.9) 
( ) ( )PPpiracyA KKcc ψθ
αθθ
pi ≡





−
⋅−⋅−⋅+−
=
2
24
22
     (2.10) 
Thus, the outside option ( )PKψ of the agent is given by (2.10) above. This is the profit 
that the agent could earn had he decided to misappropriate the IP and develop a rival 
product. We observe that the outside option of the agent is not exogenous, as in 
canonical principal-agent models (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Specifically, the value 
of the agent’s outside option depends on demand and cost parameters, the knowledge 
assimilation parameter, and most importantly, the level of knowledge shared by the 
entrepreneur. As we will see later, by appropriately choosing the level of KP, the 
principal can vary the attractiveness of the agent’s outside option. The principal can thus 
induce the agent not to misappropriate IP and stay with the contract. In particular, by 
reducing the level of IP shared, the principal can successfully diminish the value of 
outside option of the agent and hence deter the IP theft problem.  
Stage two 
At this stage the principal has already shared her IP with the agent. After the agent has 
learnt the technology, he exerts effort to produce R&D for the principal. 
Stage one 
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At this stage the contract terms are already chosen and the agent has accepted the 
contract. The principal chooses the level of IP to share with the agent that would 
maximize her profit given by (2.1).  
Stage zero 
The principal designs a contract to maximize her profit in (2.1) subject to the 
participation constraint/individual rationality constraint (IRC) of the agent:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )PcontractAA KCTepTep ψpi ≥−⋅−+⋅= 1      (2.11) 
where ( )PKψ  is given by (2.10) above. The IRC ensures that the agent accepts the 
contract. 
 
2.4 First Best Solution (FB) 
 In this section, we develop the full information first best solution, where the 
principal can perfectly observe effort exerted by the agent. Thus the principal need not 
worry about the agent’s opportunistic behavior with respect to effort, but only the 
agent’s willingness to work for the principal. The principal’s optimization problem is 
given by maximization of profit (2.1) subject to the agent’s IRC (2.11), which yields the 
first best solution as follows: 
 
Proposition 2.1 
(i) The first best full information payment to the agent is a fixed transfer  
( )
2
2 







−
+⋅−+===
vvKcKTTT FBP
FB
P
FB αψ .     (2.12) 
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(ii) The first best knowledge shared by the principal is   
( ) ( )
( )22
2
22
4
8
22
4
4
θ
αγ
θθ
θ
α
α
−
+
+−−⋅
−
−
=
cc
K FBP .       (2.13) 
(iii) The first best effort exerted by the agent is 






−
=
2
vv
e FB .    (2.14) 
where ( )FBPKψ  is computed by substituting (2.13) into (2.10). 
Proof: The Lagrangean of the optimization problem is 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )[ ]PPP KeKcTeTeKTveTveL ψαλγ −−⋅+−⋅−+⋅⋅+⋅−−⋅−+−⋅= 22 121  
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions with respect to the 
variables eandKTT P λ,,, yield the solution enumerated in Proposition 2.1. The solution 
of the Lagrange multiplier is λ =1, implying that the agent’ IRC is binding in 
equilibrium. The economic interpretation of Proposition 2.1 is as follows.  First we note 
from part (i) that the principal pays the agent a fixed wage, TFB. In the first best case, the 
principal can observe and verify effort exerted by the agent. Therefore the principal 
offers a lump-sum payment in order not to distort the agent’s incentive to work. At the 
optimum, the payment to the agent must equal the duopoly profit associated with his 
outside option as a competing firm plus the cost of his extra effort expended in 
producing the R&D. Part (ii) implies that the level of knowledge shared by the principal 
in the first best case is determined by equating the marginal benefit associated with 
reducing the cost of R&D production to the marginal cost of IP sharing. We note that the 
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marginal cost of knowledge sharing not only has a direct component γ, but also an 
indirect component ( ) 0>
∂
∂
P
P
K
Kψ
through the anticipated effect knowledge sharing will 
have on duopoly profit if the agent misappropriates knowledge. Thus a forward looking 
principal must always take into account how IP sharing might affect the value of the 
outside option of the agent. Part (iii) gives the optimal level of effort chosen by the 
agent.  The marginal benefit of an extra unit of effort exertion must be equal to the 
marginal cost of the same.  
 
Lemma 2.2  
The optimal level of knowledge shared by the principal with the agent is always positive. 
The difference in contract values of R&D (depending on whether it is a blockbuster or 
flop) is bounded between 0 and 2. 
Proof: Equation (2.13) implies that 0>FBPK  whenever ( )θθθθ fc =−−+> 4
442 23
.  
It is easy to see that ( ) ( ) ,25.11,10 −=−= ff and ( ) 0<θf over the permissible values 
of ]1,0[∈θ . On the other hand, c, being cost of production, is non-negative. Thus the 
condition ( )θfc > is always satisfied. Moreover, since ],1,0[∈e equation (2.14) implies 
that ( ) 20 ≤−≤ vv . 
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2.5 Second Best Solution (SB) 
In the second best asymmetric information case, the principal cannot be sure of the 
agent’s effort since the possibility of costless monitoring is precluded. In this case, the 
entrepreneur must be concerned with both agency problems due to IP misappropriation 
and suboptimal effort on the part of the R&D contractor. Since the entrepreneur cannot 
perfectly monitor the agent, the latter might shirk as exertion of effort to develop R&D is 
costly. In this case, the optimal contract must be designed so that the agent desires to 
produce R&D with high effort since otherwise it would not pay for the principal to offer 
any incentive. To achieve incentive compatibility, the principal must anticipate the 
agent’s optimal effort given the contractual payments. Thus in the second best case, the 
relevant constraints faced by the principal are the IRC of the agent specified in (2.11) 
and the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) given below. 
[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }egKcTepTepee P ~~1~1,0~
maxarg
−⋅+−⋅−+⋅
∈
= α     (2.15) 
When effort is not observed by the principal, she cannot write the contract contingent on 
effort. However, the principal anticipates that the agent will exert effort that will 
maximize his profit which depends on observed and verifiable outcomes. This explains 
the agent’s ICC. 
 
Proposition 2.2 
(i) The optimal second best asymmetric information payment to the agent includes a  
fixed component and a variable component that is contingent on realized R&D quality. 
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( ) ( )vvvvcKKT SBPSBPSB −+






−
−+⋅−=
2
2
αψ  if high quality R&D is realized, and 
( )
2
2 







−
−+⋅−=
vv
cKKT SBP
SB
P
SB αψ if low quality R&D is realized.  (2.16) 
(ii) The optimal second best knowledge shared by the principal is  
( ) ( )
( )22
2
22
4
8
22
4
4
θ
αγ
θθ
θ
α
α
−
+
+−−⋅
−
−
=
cc
K SBP .      (2.17) 
(iii) The optimal second best effort exerted by the agent is 






−
=
2
vv
eSB .  (2.18) 
Proof: See Appendix 1.  
When effort is unobservable, a part of the payment depends on the quality of R&D 
actually realized which, in turn, depends on agent effort. This result is in contrast to the 
first best solution, where we found that the agent would be paid a fixed fee. We also find 
that SB
SB
TT > , implying that the optimal incentive payments depend on the level of 
R&D produced by the agent. When effort cannot be observed, the principal must 
incentivize effort by rewarding good outcomes. Further, the agent’s expected profit is 
exactly equal to the outside option that he could have earned by selling a rival product. 
This is because at the optimum, the agent’s IRC must bind.  
The difference between first best and second best cases emanates from the 
verifiability of effort exerted by the agent. The marginal conditions that define optimal 
knowledge sharing by the principal remain identical whether or not effort is verifiable. 
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Thus we find that same level of knowledge will be shared by the principal in both first 
and second best situations. The expected marginal benefit of increasing effort by one 
extra unit is ( )TT − , whereas the marginal cost of doing the same is 2e. The principal 
designs the optimal incentive payments { SBSB TT , } such that agent’s expected marginal 
benefit of exerting effort is equal to ( )vv − . Second best effort exerted by the agent is 
obtained at the effort level that equates expected marginal benefit with marginal cost. 
This leads to the result that the optimal second best contract implements the first best 
effort when the agent is risk neutral (Laffont and Martimort (2002), pp.154). The agent 
exerts an efficient level of effort and gets expected profit equal to his outside option 
from producing a rival product.   
 
2.6 Fully Protected Solution (FP) 
 Finally, we consider the situation where the principal does not face the possibility 
of IP theft. This scenario might be interpreted as if the principal had access to a 
technology that would prevent IP theft or where IP can be fully protected through a 
perfectly enforceable legal system. For instance, companies that outsource database 
operations often use encryption technology. Also, when a semiconductor “fab” produces 
chips from client’s masks, copies can be made quite cheaply; consequently 
semiconductor firms are implementing novel technological solutions to protect IP from 
outsourced fabrication contractor piracy (Roy et al., 2008). We assume that the principal 
can implement the technological solution by incurring a monetary cost 0≥β . This 
  
61 
parameter might also be interpreted as the cost of perfect legal enforcement. In this case, 
the principal’s profit under the fully protected IP regime would be 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) βγpi −−−⋅−+−⋅= 2
2
1 P
FP
P KTvepTvep      (2.21) 
When IP is fully protected, either through technological solution or under the law with 
no enforcement problem, there is no IP misappropriation related outside option for the 
agent. However, the principal must still be concerned about the agent’s opportunistic 
behavior with respect to shirking on effort. Thus the problem faced by the principal is to 
maximize profit (2.21) subject to the ICC specified in (2.15) and a modified IRC of the 
agent: 
( ) ( )( ) 01 ≥−⋅−+⋅= contractAFPA CTepTeppi       (2.22) 
The solution to this problem is presented in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.3 
(i) When a fully protected technological solution is available to the principal, the optimal 
payment to the agent includes a fixed component and a variable component that is 
contingent on realized R&D quality. 
( )vvvvcT FP −+






−
−−=
22
2γ
α
 if high quality R&D is realized, and   
22
2 







−
−−=
vv
cT FP
γ
α
 if low quality R&D is realized.    (2.23) 
(ii) The optimal level of knowledge shared by the principal is 
  
62 
γ
α
=
FP
PK .           (2.24) 
(iii) The optimal effort exerted by the agent is 






−
=
2
vv
e FP .   (2.25) 
Proof: See Appendix 2.  
Since the principal cannot observe effort exerted by the agent, she would design the 
optimal incentive payments { }FPFP TT ,  contingent on the level of R&D realized. These 
incentive payments ensure that the agent will not behave opportunistically by providing 
too little effort in R&D development. We note that payments made by the principal do 
not include a “carrot” to offset duopoly profits as in first or second best cases because of 
the impossibility of IP theft due to the technological solution. 
 The level of IP shared by the principal is determined by equating the marginal 
benefit of knowledge sharing with marginal cost. Due to the technological solution, the 
principal need not worry about the possibility of knowledge misappropriation. Thus the 
principal’s marginal cost of knowledge sharing is less when a technological solution is 
available compared to when it is not. Consequently, more knowledge will be shared by 
the principal. Finally, optimal effort exerted by the agent is obtained using equi-marginal 
principle described earlier.  
 
Proposition 2.4  
Optimal knowledge sharing by the entrepreneur is lower when IP cannot be fully 
protected. 
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SB
P
FB
P
FP
P KKK =>          (2.26) 
Proof: Straightforward difference from (2.13) and (2.24) establishes this result.   
This comprises the “stick approach” to manage the IP misappropriation problem. The 
entrepreneur should disseminate less knowledge when IP theft is possible compared to a 
regime where full protection is available, either through technological protection or 
perfect legal enforcement. Without full IP protection, the entrepreneur must take a 
judicious approach while sharing her intellectual property with the outsourcing partner. 
While a high level of knowledge sharing can greatly enhance the performance of the 
agent, it can also pave the path towards misappropriation of IP. Therefore, the principal 
must not share all of her pre-existing IP with the agent. In practical terms, this may be 
accomplished by breaking the task of R&D into modules and sharing only selective 
knowledge with the agent on a “need to know” basis to develop subcomponents of a 
larger system known only to the entrepreneur. We note from equation (2.10) and Lemma 
2.1 that ( )PKψ , the outside option of the agent, is increasing in KP. By sharing less 
knowledge the principal can increase the agent’s cost of production and consequently 
dampen the agent’s incentive to walk away from the contractual relationship and become 
a rival.  
 
Proposition 2.5  
The principal would have to pay more to the agent when effort is not observable and full  
protection is unavailable compared to the situation where a technological solution is  
available.  
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(i) FPFPSBFBSB TTTTT ≥≥≥≥ when ( ) { }*,2min Dvv <−  
(ii) FPSBFPFBSB TTTTT ≥≥≥≥ when ( ) { }**,2min* DvvD ≤−≤  
(iii) FPSBFBFPSB TTTTT ≥≥≥≥ when ( ) **Dvv >−  
where ( ) ( )SBFPSB KKKD −+= αψ*  and   
( ) ( ) ( )
2
**
2
vvKKKD FBFPFB −+−+= αψ       (2.27) 
Proof: See Appendix 3.  
This is the “carrot approach” that the principal can use to protect her IP. In the first best 
situation, the principal can observe and verify effort exerted by the agent. Therefore, as 
stated in Proposition 2.1, the principal would offer a lump-sum payment to the agent. 
This lump-sum payment equals the duopoly profit from selling a competing product plus 
the cost of his effort expended in producing the R&D.  
In the second best situation, the principal cannot observe effort exerted by the 
agent. This leads to the hidden action problem, whereby the agent might under-invest in 
effort to develop high quality R&D since exertion of effort is costly. Therefore the 
principal must design the contract such that the agent has incentive to exert high effort to 
produce R&D. As stated in Proposition 2.2, the optimal incentive payments depend on 
the level of R&D produced by the agent. Further, the agent’s expected profit is exactly 
equal to the outside option that he could have earned by producing a rival product.  
Finally, in the fully protected regime, while IP theft is impossible, the principal 
still cannot observe effort exerted by the agent. This calls for incentive payments 
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contingent on the level of R&D realized. These incentive payments ensure that the agent 
would exert optimal effort. However, unlike in the first and second best case(s), we note 
that the payments do not have to include the duopoly profits because of impossibility of 
IP theft due to the technological solution. Consequently, the profit of the agent is zero 
when a full protective solution is available.  
From the above discussion we can say that the principal would have to pay less 
to the agent when full protection is available compared to a situation where it is not. This 
is the essence of the “carrot approach” of managing IP. The payments must be higher in 
a regime where IP theft is possible compared to the situation where IP theft is not 
feasible. In the first or second best cases, the payments must internalize the duopoly 
profits that the agent may be able to earn if he were to develop a rival product. 
  
Proposition 2.6  
As marginal production cost increases, the entrepreneur will share more knowledge with 
the agent. In contrast, as the marginal cost of knowledge sharing increases, she will share 
less knowledge. Also, if the ability of the agent to assimilate knowledge exceeds a 
threshold value, the principal will reduce knowledge sharing. Equivalently, if the degree 
of substitution between the entrepreneur’s product and the potential rival product 
resulting from misappropriated IP exceeds a threshold value, then the principal must 
share less knowledge with the agent.  
(i) 0>
∂
∂
c
K FBP
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(ii) 0<
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Proofs of parts (i) and (ii) are straightforward and hence omitted for brevity.  
Proof of part (iii): ( ) ( )
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The expression in the second parentheses of the numerator is negative by Lemma 2.1. 
The denominator is positive, being a square term. Thus the whole expression is negative 
when the expression in the first parentheses of the numerator is positive. Formally, the 
required condition is ( ) *
8
4 22
α
θγ
α ≡
−
> . An equivalent condition would 
be *84
2/12
θ
γ
αθ ≡





−> . 
Intuitively, part (i) implies that if the principal’s cost of production increases, the 
entrepreneur will outsource more vigorously. In that case, she would be willing to share 
more knowledge in order to make the outsourcing contract successful. Part (ii) implies 
that with an increase in the marginal cost of knowledge sharing, the entrepreneur would 
reduce the optimal level of knowledge shared.  
In part (iii), the parameter α is the degree to which the agent can effectively assimilate 
IP shared by principal. It could encompass the absorptive capacity, complementary 
  
67 
assets, and co-specialized knowledge that would determine how effectively the agent can 
learn the shared technology. Indeed, as Teece (1986) explains, the possibility of 
knowledge leakage depends on the degree to which the supplier can effectively use the 
shared know-how. When it is easier for the agent to assimilate knowledge, the principal 
would share less IP if the intensity of imitation exceeds a threshold level *α . This result 
provides an idea on the plausibility of the technology being copied. If the technology is 
difficult to copy, the entrepreneur may share more knowledge with the agent. 
An alternative interpretation of part (iii) is also possible. If the degree of 
substitutability in customer demand parameter, θ, exceeds a certain threshold level, θ*, 
then the entrepreneur should be concerned with potential IP theft by the R&D contractor. 
If the principal expects that the agent might walk away from the contract and produce a 
highly substitutable product, she should share less IP in the first place. Both of these 
interpretations provide insight on issues like, “when is it safe for an entrepreneur to share 
pre-existing IP with the agent?” When the agent has a brand name and portfolio of 
related products already established in the marketplace, it has higher chance of walking 
away from the relationship and introduce a rival product. This might have played a role 
in the Lexar and Toshiba example discussed in Chapter I. 
 
Proposition 2.7 
As the entrepreneur shares more of her intellectual property with the agent, the latter is 
able to charge a lower price for his competing product. It also affects the profit of the 
agent favorably: 
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This proposition captures the effect of the principal’s IP sharing on the agent if the latter 
decides to walk away from the contract and develop a rival product. We find that 
increased IP sharing by the principal reduces the price charged by the pirate firm. It also 
has a positive effect on the pirate’s profit. This result is consistent with the Chery 
example, where Chery charged a lower price for its QQ than Spark produced by GM-
Daewoo (Liu and Fernandez, 2007). Thus we see how the agent might use IP shared by 
the principal towards its own commercial benefit. 
 
Proposition 2.8 
The entrepreneur makes a higher profit when a technological solution is available at a  
low cost. However, if the cost of technological solution is higher than a threshold, then  
the entrepreneur is better off using the carrot and stick approach. 
FB
P
SB
P
FP
P pipipi => when ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]222 SBPFPPSBPFPPSBP KKKKK −−−+< γαψβ  
FB
P
SB
P
FP
P pipipi =≤ otherwise.  
Proof: See Appendix 4.  
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This result captures the relative attractiveness of the carrot and stick mechanism when IP 
theft is feasible vs. the technological/legal solution when IP theft is not feasible. The 
equality of profits under the first and second best case is due to our assumptions of risk 
neutrality of the agent; even if effort exerted by the agent is not observable by the 
principal, the second best contract leads to the first best effort and profit for each party.  
The interesting tradeoff involves the second best case where IP theft is feasible 
vs. the full protection solution where IP theft is not feasible. If β , the cost of 
implementing the technological solution or perfect legal enforcement is lower than a 
threshold, the entrepreneur would be better off investing in these technologies. However, 
if cost of legal enforcement/technological solution is prohibitively high, the appropriate 
mechanism would be the use the carrot and stick approach. In that case, we suggest that 
the principal share less of her pre-existing IP and give high incentive payments to the 
agent so that IP theft is deterred and high effort is ensured simultaneously.  
 
2.7 Discussion 
 What can entrepreneurs do to mitigate risks of IP loss while outsourcing R&D to 
an agent? According to our paper, entrepreneurs can use two types of strategies.  The 
first strategy is to implement a carrot and stick approach while designing an outsourcing 
contract. The second strategy is to ensure that the shared IP cannot be duplicated easily 
by the agent. There are three alternative approaches to implement the second strategy. 
One approach would be to produce a differentiated product and invest in branding and 
advertising to enable consumers to better understand the unique characteristics of the 
  
70 
product. The second approach might be to break the task into modules and outsource 
them to different contractors. The third approach is to invest in technological solutions 
that would render IP theft infeasible. We discuss these different strategies in the light of 
real life examples and relate them to the suggestions offered by existing literature.  
i) Carrot and Stick (CS): The suggested approach of using higher payments to the 
agent and less knowledge sharing by the principal concurs with the high powered 
incentive based solutions in the literature (e.g. Ulset, 1996; Lai et al., 2009). We suggest 
that firms should use incentive payments along with appropriate disincentives through 
less knowledge sharing. Following Proposition 2.4, a forward looking entrepreneur who 
suspects eventual theft of IP ought to share an amount of knowledge that is just 
sufficient for the completion of the outsourcing project.  
We find support for our proposition of cautious IP sharing among medical device 
manufacturers who outsource everything (prototyping, materials, and electronics) except 
their core IP. For instance, Medtronic never outsources the development of the algorithm 
that its pacemaker uses to monitor heart rhythm, but does outsource tasks involving 
specialized expertise (Boehner, 2008). Additional support for guarded IP sharing is 
provided by Incat, the Australian manufacturer and designer of large, high speed 
catamaran ferries. This company successfully manages risk associated with potential 
dissipation of its IP and know-how by not transferring mainstream design to its Hong 
Kong based partner (McCaughey et al., 2000).   
ii) Product Differentiation (PD): By producing differentiated products and using 
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branding and advertising as a strategy, firms can mitigate IP concerns. Using this 
strategy, the entrepreneur can diminish the profit of the R&D contractor from 
establishing a rival product. Consequently, it also lowers the incentive payments 
necessary to outsource R&D from the contractor.  In our model, when θ, the degree of 
product differentiation is low, the entrepreneur may share more IP with the outsourcing 
agent, by Proposition 2.6 part (iii). More importantly, the strategy of product 
differentiation can also work favorably for companies who have actually experienced IP 
misappropriation. Indeed, no matter how much precaution a firm takes, leakage may not 
be prevented to the fullest extent (Liebeskind, 1997). Therefore firms ought to think of 
strategies that would work in an ex-post sense, after IP leakage/misappropriation has 
actually occurred. According to our model, in case of IP misappropriation, there will be 
two competing products in the market with same basic IP embedded in them. Other 
things remaining the same, if the competing products are too similar then consumers will 
prefer the one that is cheaper. There are various reasons why the pirate firm might be 
able to undercut the entrepreneur. Proposition 2.7 enumerates the effect of the 
principal’s knowledge sharing on the price charged by the pirate firm and there is 
evidence of this undercutting effect in both the GM-Chery and Lexar-Toshiba examples 
(Liu and Fernandez, 2007; Fair Disclosure Wire, 2005).  
Given the plausibility of price undercutting by the (newly formed) rival firm, the 
entrepreneur might find it useful to employ business strategies that would make her 
product more dissimilar at least as perceived by customers. The entrepreneur may 
achieve this by providing complementary inimitable services with the products, 
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introducing new versions of products, or establishing brand reputation. To the extent that 
the products are favorably received by consumers, the entrepreneur might be able to 
survive an otherwise dangerous IP theft. For example, Lexar invested in product 
differentiation strategy by introducing flash memory cards with higher writing speed and 
larger capacities to remain competitive (Lexar Media, 2006).  
iii) Modularization (M): Another practical way to deter IP theft would be to 
invest in technologies that would make copying too costly for the agent. This might be 
accomplished by modularization of outsourcing tasks along the lines of what is called 
structural isolation (Liebeskind, 1997). If the agent gets access to only parts of the 
production process or trade secrets, it might be too costly for him to misuse the 
information. Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a) find that firms in the IT sector often use 
modularity of outsourced tasks to protect IP. In our paper, the “stick” approach of less 
knowledge sharing might be regarded as a modularization strategy. The solution 
essentially relies on exposing small parcels of knowledge so that the agent cannot fully 
understand the overall technology and so cannot misappropriate the entrepreneur’s IP. 
iv) Fully Protected solution (FP): The final approach would be to invest in 
technologies to ensure IP is secured completely. Examples include advanced encryption, 
watermarking, and digital rights management (DRM).  
The relative effectiveness of these four strategies in protecting pre-existing IP of 
the entrepreneur depends on several factors. CS requires the entrepreneur to provide high 
powered incentives to the R&D contractor which can be costly to negotiate and enforce.  
Further, while less knowledge sharing is recommended, in realistic terms, it can be very 
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difficult to determine the extent of knowledge that should be shared. Less knowledge 
sharing by the principal might render the agent less productive and hence affect the 
outsourced R&D project adversely. The M strategy could be too costly for the principal. 
It would require coordination of the tasks in different locations and involve high 
transaction costs in a Coasean sense. The PD strategy relies on consumer acceptance and 
willingness to pay a premium for the differentiated product. Finally, the FP strategy 
would require additional ex-ante investment by the entrepreneur. Notwithstanding the 
fact that legal tools like Non Disclosure Agreements, restrictive covenants exist, one 
cannot guarantee that any of the methods are infallible. Indeed, companies ought to 
assess the relative costs and benefits of adopting these alternative strategies to protect IP 
under outsourcing engagements.  
Finally, the nature of the industry is also an important factor. For entrepreneurial 
ventures in certain industries (like biotechnology, pharmaceutical, semiconductor and 
electronics) the cost of developing new products is enormous. While the development of 
IP involves huge R&D investments, the cost of copying the technology is relatively low 
(Branscomb et al. (1999), pp. 308). Therefore these products are characterized by high 
intensity of imitation (α in our model). Consequently, firms in these industries must 
carefully evaluate the outsourcing proposition and take proactive strategies before 
sharing their pre-existing IP with their agents. Investing in product differentiation, 
modularization and technological solutions might be particularly effective. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
 Firms need to share their IP with supply chain partners ever more frequently 
under outsourcing contracts. However, assets such as know-how and trade secrets are 
intrinsically difficult to protect, particularly when enforcement is weak. Under certain 
circumstances, this can lead to supplier opportunism and emergence of rival products. 
Protection of IP in outsourcing relationships calls for strategic management tools. In 
particular, a carrot and stick approach may be useful to combat the problem. An 
entrepreneur should share less IP with the agent if there is potential misappropriation 
problem. This “stick” approach renders the prospect of misappropriation less attractive 
when compared to continuing with the contract relationship. In conjunction with the 
stick approach, the agent must also be given “carrots” in the form of incentive payments 
such that he exerts optimal effort towards the R&D task. In addition, we suggest that 
complementary strategies like product differentiation and modularization of tasks could 
make misappropriation of IP too costly for the agent. Product differentiation might be a 
useful strategy not only to prevent IP theft, but also when IP theft has actually occurred.  
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CHAPTER III 
OUTSOURCING BY FOOD PROCESSING FIRMS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 “Although we have more than 4500 people in Nestlé Food and Beverages R&D, 
we cannot achieve our ambitions simply by working internally. We increasingly operate 
in an Open Innovation mode to enhance our own internal R&D capability by tapping 
into external resources.”- From www.nestle.com 
 Strategic alliances are becoming increasingly important in the food and 
agribusiness industry. As firms outsource their non-core activities to suppliers-
contractors, they are able to concentrate on their core functions like product 
development, marketing and so on. The economic benefit of organizing tasks through 
outsourcing is attributed to efficiency gains from specialization. According to Prahalad 
and Hamel (1990), firms should keep core activities in-house and outsource non-core 
tasks if there are significant cost advantages. Examples of core competencies include 
chocolate technology (Hershey), baking (Nabisco), and refrigerated dough (Pillsbury) 
which are kept in-house. H-E-B maintains a new product development staff and 
develops private label products in-house. In contrast, companies like Domino Foods, 
Kraft routinely outsource non-core tasks like Information Technology (IT) to 
Capgemini, which allow them to concentrate on their core competencies.  
Evidently, food processing companies are assessing their core competencies and 
revisiting “make or buy” decision (Lord, 2000). For instance, according to a survey by 
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Grant Thornton and Food Processing magazine, almost 68% of food and beverage 
manufacturers indicated that some part of their production is outsourced (Grant 
Thornton, 2008). In contrast, 68% of food and beverage manufacturers choose to keep 
their R&D/product development activities in-house. The survey suggests that while it is 
common among food processing companies to outsource manufacturing, they generally 
organize R&D tasks internally.  
For the purpose of this chapter, we focus on R&D /innovation activities that can 
be very costly if done entirely in-house. Food processing companies willing to develop 
new, innovative products face several technical challenges. For example, R&D tasks like 
flavor formulation are becoming increasingly complex as companies are trying to 
produce differentiated products with low calorie, low fat content without sacrificing the 
taste. Therefore firms are taking advantage of supplier expertise in ingredients to 
enhance quality, taste, texture, or health benefits (Lord, 2000). Food and beverage 
companies outsource R&D to gain access to technology/equipment, access new ideas, 
increase capacity and lower costs (Grant Thornton, 2008). Thus modern food product 
development requires technologies that are available beyond a firm’s own boundaries. 
For example, we present the following cases of innovation outsourcing by some of the 
successful brands: 
a) Procter and Gamble (P&G) launched a new line of Pringles potato chips with 
pictures and words printed on each crisp (Huston and Sakkab, 2006). If the R&D 
were done with in-house resources it would have taken at least two years to 
launch the product. But with a successful open innovation approach, Pringles was 
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able to bring the new product in less than a year and at a fraction of the cost of 
in-house development.                                 
b) General Mills launched its Worldwide Innovation Network in 2007 and since 
then it has outsourced innovation for several of its products. General Mills 
worked with longtime supplier, Kerry Ingredients and Flavors to develop the 
breakthrough innovation like Yoplait Smoothie (www.generalmills.com). 
c) In 2010, Coca-Cola outsourced flavor technology from Chromocell Corp. to 
develop sweetness enhancers and natural sweeteners for its reduced calorie 
beverages. Likewise, PepsiCo collaborated with Senomyx to develop sweetness 
enhancers and natural high-intensity sweeteners for its innovative products. 
These examples corroborate with Berne (1995)’s observation that companies need no 
longer conduct product development inside company walls under a shroud of secrecy 
with no outside assistance. Since firms rarely possess all of the necessary expertise to 
develop new products, they are facing the need to outsource product development 
activities to outside suppliers (Lord, 2000).  
 
3.2 Problems Related to Outsourcing 
While outsourcing has opened up new avenues for companies in terms of 
organizing tasks, the benefits come with two critical problems. The first problem arises 
when a company outsources a task, it has to disclose its valuable intellectual property 
(henceforth, IP) like trade secrets including product formulations, processes, knowhow, 
business plans with the contractor/service provider. While the company shares its pre-
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existing IP with the contractor for the purpose of the project, under certain circumstances 
the latter can misappropriate the IP towards its own benefit. Depending on available 
opportunities, the agent might sell the company’s IP to its rivals or even start producing 
a competing product. For example, according to a 1996 joint venture agreement between 
Danone and Wahaha, the latter could not manufacture goods that compete directly with 
products produced by the joint venture. In 2007, Danone accused Wahaha of setting up 
operations that competed with its own dairy operations (Wall Street Journal, 2009). This 
was in defiance of contractual obligations and resulted in an estimated loss of $100 
million in revenue. Given that modern enterprises derive significant value from their IP, 
a loss of IP may lead to adverse effects on profitability, brand image and competitive 
advantage of a company. As knowledge is becoming recognized as a strategic asset and 
a basis for rivalry among firm (Teece, 2000a; Sporleder and Moss, 2002), companies are 
concerned with protecting their IP when they outsource business functions to 
contractors.  
The second problem associated with outsourcing emanates from the fact that it is 
impossible for a company to monitor the activities of the contractor. In particular, the 
company cannot control whether the contractor is exerting desired effort on the project 
or shirking. Depending on the nature of the outsourced task, shirking may lead to severe 
consequences for a company. Thus if a contract manufacturer exerts less effort it can 
lead to higher costs; if a R&D contractor shirks then it can lead to low quality product.  
Food processing companies are indeed concerned about these two problems 
associated with outsourcing. The survey conducted by Grant Thornton and Food 
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Processing magazine indicates that higher costs (25%), poor product (25%) and loss of 
IP (16%) are significant problems encountered when outsourcing production. Moreover, 
about 36% of the firms that outsource R&D indicate that loss of IP is the most 
significant problem. In order to avoid these pitfalls, companies often resort to 
internalization of tasks. By doing R&D in-house these companies seek to control their 
products and protect their intellectual property more effectively. However, doing tasks 
in-house may involve higher cost due to loss of efficiency.  
 
3.3 Research Questions 
 Food processing companies face an important trade-off when deciding to do a 
task in-house or via outsourcing. Organizing tasks in-house involve higher cost whereas 
outsourcing comes with the problem of IP misappropriation risk. Given this trade off, we 
inquire, what determines a firm’s choice of organization between in-house and 
outsourcing? Secondly, how does a company mitigate the two agency problems 
associated with outsourcing. In particular, how does a company safeguard its IP and 
ensure that the contractor exerts optimal effort on the outsourced tasks? We find that the 
organizational choice depends on three factors: the degree of in-house inefficiency, the 
strength of contractual enforcement and value of the IP under consideration. We also 
find that it is possible to mitigate the agency problems by designing contracts 
appropriately. In particular, a carrot and stick strategy of sharing less knowledge and 
rewarding the agent with incentive payments is an effective way to manage the IP 
misappropriation and shirking problems.   
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3.4 Literature Review 
 Economic theory suggests that firms would organize a task in-house if the 
transaction costs of using the market are high (Coase, 1937). Thus the organizational 
criterion is minimization of transaction and production costs (Williamson, 1979). 
Several studies underline the role of vertical integration as a solution to increased 
transaction costs. According to Hennessy (1996), information asymmetry about input 
quality is one of the major reasons behind vertical integration in the food industry in the 
U.S. Barkema and Cook (1993) point out that integration can lead to reduced transaction 
costs due to search cost and risk cost of procuring inferior raw material. According to 
Ulset (1996), transaction costs in R&D depend on uncertainty, non-deployable effort and 
potential technology leakage problem. 
 In the food and fiber chain there are opportunities to outsource business functions 
that can lead to competitive advantages (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). They find that 
cotton producers’ decision to outsource marketing is positively related with trust that 
producers place on the cooperatives. They also find that managers may not outsource if 
the expected costs from loss of control exceed the expected benefit of putting a business 
function into the hands of an outside agent. Spaulding and Woods (2006) found that 
outsourcing significantly reduces product development time in the North American 
confectionary manufacturing industry. Thus outsourcing makes the product development 
more efficient when a firm lacks in-house expertise. However, two important concerns 
with outsourcing are loss of control and risk of exposing the new product idea to 
outsiders (Spaulding and Woods, 2006). The existing literature offers the following  
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solutions to the problem of IP protection in outsourcing.  
 According to Ulset (1996), firms should use contractual safeguards (like 
exclusivity clauses) as well as high powered incentives to manage outsourced R&D 
projects. If the supplier develops R&D, then it must be given property rights on the R&D 
output. Lai et al. (2009) consider innovation outsourcing in the presence of information 
leakage. They find that when an agent develops a new process innovation, a revenue 
sharing contract can deter IP leakage by the agent. Finally, Ho (2009) finds that when a 
contractor might sell the R&D to a rival, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be 
pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. 
 Our paper differs from the existing literature in following ways. First, we 
consider the problem of protecting pre-existing IP of the principal. This is in contrast to 
Ulset (1996), Lai et al. (2009) and Ho (2009) who consider protection of IP that is 
developed by the agent. We argue that sharing of pre-existing IP is an important source 
of IP misappropriation. Food processing companies need to share their trade secrets, 
knowhow, business plans with their outsourcing supplier. While knowledge sharing is 
imperative for the supplier to accomplish the tasks, it can lead to unintended 
consequences of misappropriation. Secondly, when a company outsources productive 
activities to a contractor-supplier, it loses control over the task. It is impossible for the 
principal to monitor the actions of the agent and consequently faces a moral hazard 
problem. The contractor may shirk on the R&D task, which would lead to considerable 
project uncertainty. We contribute to the literature by designing a contractual solution to 
mitigate two problems in outsourcing due to a) IP misappropriation and b) shirking  
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 by the agent.     
 
3.5 A Model  
 In order to facilitate the discussion, we consider a food processing company 
(principal) developing a breakthrough product with reduced calorie content. During the 
R&D phase of the product development the principal wants to test certain attributes of 
the product. The R&D task could be testing human allergic reaction or a flavor 
preference study to discern appropriate flavor formulation and so on. The principal has 
two options to conduct the product testing and flavor preference study. It may establish a 
R&D unit in-house or outsource the task to an independent supplier/R&D contractor 
(agent). Thus in the first mode of organization, the agent is an employee of the principal, 
whereas under outsourcing the agent is independent unit. In order for the agent to 
accomplish the R&D task, the principal discloses its pre-existing intellectual property 
with the agent using a Non Disclosure Agreement. We consider the principal’s IP to be a 
trade secret involving the product formulation/ know-how related to manufacturing 
process that has economic value from not being known to the public. However, once the 
agent gets access to the principal’s IP, it may misappropriate the IP and sell it to a rival 
of the principal. Instead, if the agent decides to work for the principal, it exerts effort to 
do the testing and evaluation of the product. The nature of information asymmetry faced 
by the principal is that of moral hazard. The agent exerts effort that is unobserved and 
not verifiable by the principal. We develop a principal- agent model by closely following 
Laffont and Martimort (2002).The problem of the principal is to design a contract to 
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ensure that the agent does not misappropriate its IP and also exerts optimal level of effort 
on the R&D project.  
 
3.5.1 Timing of Actions 
 We consider a game comprising of the following stages. 
Stage1. The principal offers a R&D contract { }),(),,( luhvC ∈ contingent on project 
outcome { }failuresuccessX ,∈ .  If the project outcome is a “success” then a high quality 
product is realized. The principal gets gross revenue v from selling the high quality 
product and pays h to the agent. On the other hand, if the project outcome is a “failure” 
then a low quality product is realized. In this case the principal gets gross revenue u from 
selling the low quality product and pays l to the agent. We assume uv > and lh > . Thus 
the project return spread is ( )uv −  and the payment spread is ( )lh − . 
 If the agent accepts the contract then the principal shares its pre-existing 
intellectual property (k) with the agent. The agent signs a NDA that it would not disclose 
the principal’s trade secret to third parties. If the agent breaches the contract it will have 
to pay a penalty β . 
Stage2. The agent decides { }contractleavecontractwithstayY ,∈ . 
Stage3. If the agent leaves the contract, it sells the IP of the principal to a rival. If the 
agent stays with the contract, then he exerts non contractible effort, e on the R&D 
project.   
Stage4. The payoffs are realized according to the observed project 
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outcome { }failuresuccessX ,∈ .  
 
3.5.2 Solution 
We solve the game using backward induction to obtain Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,  
Stage 4: In the last stage of the game, the payoffs are realized according to the R&D 
contract. Given the project outcome { }failuresuccessX ,∈ , the payments are made 
according to the contract { }),(),,( luhvC ∈ . We assume that the probability distribution 
of return depends on e, the level of effort exerted by the agent as well as k, the level of 
knowledge shared by the principal. Thus knowledge sharing is intended to facilitate the 
task assigned to the agent. Specifically, let the probability of success be ( )ke + and the 
probability of failure be ( )ke +−1 . The project uncertainty is formalized as follows: 
( )



−−
+
=
keyprobabilitwithu
keyprobabilitwithv
returnGross
1
       
We assume that the principal incurs a cost of sharing its IP with the agent. Specifically, 
we consider the cost of knowledge sharing to be a convex function 2)( kkf = .Thus the 
expected profit of the principal from outsourcing is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 klukehvkeE OP −−⋅−−+−⋅+=pi .     (3.1) 
After the principal shares its IP with the agent, the agent decides whether to stay with the 
contract or to misappropriate the IP towards its own benefit. The possibility of IP 
misappropriation comprises an agency problem associated with outsourcing. After 
getting access to the principal’s valuable IP, the agent might sell it to a rival firm. We 
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assume that the agent is able to sell the IP to a rival at a price sk, where 01 ≥≥ s .  
However, since the agent signs a NDA with the principal, it also has to pay a penalty β  
for misappropriating the IP. Thus the outside option of the agent is equal to the net 
benefit from misappropriating the principal’s IP. Formally, the outside option is denoted 
by 
βψ −⋅= ksk)( .         (3.2) 
If the agent decides to stay with the contract, then it has to exert effort on the R&D 
project. We consider the cost of exerting effort to be a convex function 2)( eeg = . Thus 
the expected profit of the agent from the contract is  
( ) ( ) 21 elkehkeE OA −⋅−−+⋅+=pi .       (3.3) 
We note that the effort of the agent is not contractible. This leads to the second agency 
problem associated with outsourcing. Since the effort is not contractible, the agent may 
choose to shirk. From the principal’s perspective shirking is not desirable since her 
expected profit is increasing in the level of effort exerted by the agent. The objective of 
the principal is to design a contract that would mitigate the two agency problems 
associated with outsourcing, viz. IP misappropriation and shirking by the agent.  
Stage 3: At this stage, the agent exerts effort on the project. The principal needs to 
design a contract that is incentive compatible for the agent to exert optimal effort on the 
project. Formally, the contractual payments must satisfy the following incentive 
compatibility constraint (ICC) of the agent: 
O
A
e
Ee pimaxarg= .         (3.4) 
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The first order condition of the agent’s optimization problem yields the optimal effort 
under outsourcing: 
( )lhe −=
2
1
.           (3.5) 
Stage 2: At this stage of the game the agent has access to the IP of the principal and 
decides on { }contractleavecontractwithstayY ,∈ .The decision is made by comparing 
the profits from the alternative choices. Since the principal wants that the agent should 
not misappropriate its IP, it would have to ensure that the expected profit of the agent 
from the contract is higher than the outside option of the agent. In other words, the 
incentive payments must satisfy the following individual rationality constraint (IRC) of 
the agent: 
( ) ( ) )(1 2 kelkehkeE OA ψpi ≥−⋅−−+⋅+= .      (3.6) 
Stage 1: At this stage, the principal offers contract C to the agent. If the agent accepts the 
contract, the principal shares its pre-existing IP with the agent. Formally, the principal 
solves the following optimization problem: 
O
Pklh
EMax pi
,,
 subject to (3.5) and (3.6).       (3.7)  
 
Proposition 3.1 
(i) When the project is outsourced, the optimal payment to the agent is 
( ) ( ) ( ) β−−⋅−⋅−−⋅+= 22
4
3
2
11 uvsuvshO if project outcome is success,  (3.8a) 
( ) ( ) β−−⋅−⋅−−⋅= 22
4
3
2
1
uvsuvsl O if project outcome is failure,   (3.8b) 
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(ii) Optimal level of knowledge shared by the principal is     
( )suvk O −−⋅=
2
1
, and         (3.8c) 
(iii) Optimal level of effort exerted by the agent is 
( )uveO −⋅=
2
1
.          (3.8d) 
(iv) Consequently the expected profit of the principal from outsourcing is  
( ) ( ) βpi +++−⋅−−⋅= usuvsuvE OP 422
1 22
      (3.8e) 
and the expected profit of the agent is  
( ) βpi −−−⋅⋅= suvsE OA 2
1
respectively.       (3.8f) 
Proof: See Appendix 5. 
From part (i) of the proposition, we note that the optimal incentive payments vary across 
the realizations of R&D output. In other words, the optimal contract offered to the agent 
is not “fixed payment” type. Instead, a variable payment contract is required to ensure 
that the agent has appropriate incentive to exert effort in the presence of moral hazard.   
 The parameter β may be considered as an indicator of enforcement of IP laws in 
the economy. The magnitude of this parameter reflects how easy it would be for the 
agent to misappropriate the principal’s IP.  If contractual enforcement is weak (i.e. β is 
low) then the principal would have to pay higher incentive payments to the agent. This is 
due to the fact that when enforcement is weak, the agent would have more incentive to 
misappropriate the principal’s IP. Therefore the principal needs to increase the incentive 
payments so that the agent stays with the contract. The practical implication of this result 
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is noteworthy. If a company is willing to outsource tasks to a location with weak legal 
enforcement, it needs to optimally increase the payments to the agent. In contrast, if the 
task is outsourced to a location with strong enforcement of IP laws, then the principal 
needs to pay lower incentive payments.  
 From part (ii) of proposition 3.1 we observe that the optimal level of IP shared by 
the principal is increasing in project return spread. Also, as expected, it is decreasing in 
the parameter s, the price that the rival is willing to pay for the IP. The higher the market 
value of the IP, the lesser will it be shared.      
 In part (iii) we observe that the optimally chosen effort is an increasing function 
of the spread of project return. The incentive payments are designed such that the ICC of 
the agent is satisfied and it exerts optimal effort on the project.  
 Lastly, in part (iv) we note that the agent gets from the contract an expected 
profit exactly equal to the outside option from selling the IP. This is due to the fact that 
that the IRC of the agent is binding. Thus the incentive payments are designed to deter 
both the IP misappropriation and the shirking problems.  
 
Lemma 3.1 
The principal will share a non-negative knowledge with the agent. This is ensured by  
( ) ( ) suvsuvk O ≥−⇔≥−−⋅= 0
2
1
.  
Also, the probability of success is bounded within [ ]1,0 . Therefore we need 
0
2
101 ≥−−≥⇔≥+≥ suvke OO . 
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Combining the two inequalities we have  
( ) suvs ≥−≥+
2
1 .          (3.9) 
The above inequality suggests that the project return spread is bounded.  
 
3.6 In-house R&D 
 We now consider a regime where the principal organizes the R&D task in-house. 
In order to capture the interesting trade-offs between outsourcing and in-house 
organization, we introduce two differences. First, we assume that if the task is 
accomplished in-house then more time and resources will be required. Let the cost of 
exerting effort in-house be 2ed ⋅ where 1>d . In other words, the principal faces 
operational inefficiency if the task is done in-house. This captures the situation in 
Pringles Prints example described earlier. Secondly, we assume that the principal can 
avoid the problem of IP misappropriation if the task is done in-house. This assumption is 
along the lines of Lai et al. (2009) who consider that in-house employees have no 
incentive to leak information due to loyalty to the company. However, even if the R&D 
is done in-house, the principal cannot monitor the effort of the agent and therefore 
continues to face the moral hazard problem due to shirking. Given this setup, the 
expected profit of the agent is  
( ) ( ) 21 edlkehkeE IA ⋅−⋅−−+⋅+=pi .      (3.10) 
When R&D in conducted in-house, the effort is determined from the ICC:  
I
A
e
I Ee pimaxarg= .          (3.11) 
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The first order condition of this optimization problem yields  
( )lh
d
e I −⋅=
2
1
.         (3.12) 
When R&D is done in-house, IP misappropriation is not possible. Thus in contrast to 
outsourcing, the outside option of the agent is equal to the market wage, which we 
normalize to zero. Consequently the participation constraint of the agent is  
( ) ( ) 01 2 ≥⋅−⋅−−+⋅+= edlkehkeE IApi .      (3.13) 
The principal would maximize its expected profit given by (3.1) subject to (3.12) and 
IRC (3.13) of the agent. The solution to this problem leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.2 
(i) If the project is done in-house, the optimal payment to the agent will be  
( ) ( )2
4
12
uv
d
d
uvh I −⋅




 +
−−= if project outcome is success and             (3.14a) 
( )2222 2242
4
1
uvdudvuvduv
d
l I −−−−+⋅= if project outcome is failure,            (3.14b) 
(ii) Optimal level of knowledge shared by the principal is  
( )uvk I −⋅=
2
1
                    (3.14c) 
(iii) Optimal effort exerted is 
( )uv
d
e I −⋅=
2
1
.                   (3.14d) 
(iv) Consequently, the expected profit of the principal is  
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( ) uuv
d
dE IP +−⋅




 +
=
2
4
1
pi                   (3.14e) 
and expected profit of the agent is  
0=IAEpi .                    (3.14f) 
Proof: See Appendix 6. 
We observe that the payments are contingent on the realized R&D outcome. Thus 
incentive payments are designed to solve the moral hazard problem due to shirking. 
Since there is no possibility of IP misappropriation, optimal knowledge sharing depends 
only on project return spread. The optimal effort is increasing in return spread and is 
decreasing in d, the inefficiency associated with in-house R&D. Finally, we note that the 
expected profit of the agent is equal to zero, the normalized market wage. This is due to 
the fact that the participation constraint of the agent is binding. In contrast to proposition 
3.1 part (iv), we find that the agent makes more than the market wage under outsourcing. 
This is because the principal would have to increase the incentive payments under 
outsourcing to dissuade IP misappropriation.    
 
Lemma 3.2 
Since the principal will share a non-negative knowledge with the agent, we need 
( ) ( ) 00
2
1 ≥−⇔≥−⋅= uvuvk I .  
Also, the probability of success is bounded within [ ]1,0 . Therefore we need 
0
1
201 ≥−≥
+
⇔≥+≥ uv
d
dke II .       (3.15) 
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This suggests that the project return spread is bounded.  
 
Proposition 3.3 
Optimal level of effort exerted under outsourcing is greater than effort exerted in-house: 
IO
ee > .          (3.16) 
Proof: ( ) 011
2
1
>





−⋅−=−
d
uvee IO since by assumption 1>d . 
This result is due to the fact that the marginal cost of exerting effort is more if the task is 
done in-house. Hence lower effort will be exerted in-house compared to outsourcing 
regime. This result explains the Pringle Prints example- had the R&D been done in-
house it would have taken at least two years to accomplish the objective. Since the task 
was outsourced, the product development was possible within less than a year. The 
increased effort leads to efficiency gain in outsourcing.  
 
Proposition 3.4 
The optimal incentive payments are higher under outsourcing when legal enforcement is 
weak. In contrast, under strong legal enforcement the in-house incentive payments are 
higher than under outsourcing. Formally,  
*ββ ≤≥≥ ifllandhh IOIO and 
*ββ ≥≤≤ ifllandhh IOIO where  
( ) ( ) 




 −
⋅−−⋅−−⋅=
d
d
uvsuvs
1
2
1
*
22β .      (3.17) 
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Proof: From part (i) of Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 we obtain 
( ) ( ) β−




 −
⋅−−⋅−−⋅=−=−
d
d
uvsuvsllhh IOIO 1
2
1 22
. This expression is positive 
if ( ) ( ) 




 −
⋅−−⋅−−⋅=≤
d
d
uvsuvs
1
2
1
*
22ββ  and negative if *ββ ≥ . 
The economic intuition for this result is as follows. If legal enforcement is weak, the 
penalty parameter β is low. Therefore the agent will have more incentive to sell the IP to 
a rival. In order to avoid this situation, the principal would have to increase the incentive 
payments to the agent. We observe that the incentive payments{ }OO lh , offered under 
outsourcing are both higher than the in-house payments{ }II lh , . Thus when legal 
enforcement is weak, a food processing firm would have to pay higher incentive 
payments to the agent in order to deter IP misappropriation. This explains why 
companies tend to organize R&D in-house instead of outsourcing even though the latter 
is efficient.  
 On the other hand, if legal enforcement is strong (β is high), then the outside 
option of the agent becomes too low. Hence the agent will have less incentive to walk 
away from the contract. The principal would need to pay less incentive payments for the 
agent to stay within the contractual relationship.  
 Since the problem of IP protection becomes severe under weak legal 
enforcement, we consider a scenario where β is low. Then from Proposition 3.4 we can 
derive the following result.  
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Corollary 3.1 
(i) Carrot and Stick strategy: When legal enforcement is weak, the principal will have to 
pay higher incentive payments to the agent under outsourcing:  
( ) ( ) 




 −
⋅−−⋅−−⋅=≤≥≥
d
d
uvsuvsifllandhh IOIO 1
2
1
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22ββ .    
(ii) However, the principal will share less information with the agent under outsourcing: 
IO kk ≤ .          (3.18) 
Proof: Part (i) follows directly from (3.16) and 0
2
≥=− skk OI .  
If there is possibility of misappropriation, the principal must optimally share less 
knowledge with the agent. It is important to note the consequences of reduced 
knowledge sharing on ( )kψ , the outside option of the agent. Less knowledge sharing will 
diminish the attractiveness of outside option of the agent and weaken its incentive to 
misappropriate the principal’s IP. As the agent stays within the contract, he must exert 
high effort to increase the probability of success, since reduced knowledge sharing by 
principal decreases the probability of success. Therefore there is a built in mechanism in 
the contract so that the agent must increase effort to increase the probability of success. 
Increased effort, however, entails higher cost and consequently the principal must pay 
higher incentive payments to the agent. Thus a carrot and stick strategy of lower 
knowledge sharing and higher incentive payments may mitigate the two agency 
problems associated with outsourcing.    
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Proposition 3.5 
Even under the possibility of IP misappropriation, the choice of organizational form is 
not trivial. The principal may outsource the R&D project to an independent contractor if 
it is inefficient to do the task in-house.  Formally, 
*ddifEE IPOP ≥≥ pipi and 
*ddifEE IPOP ≤≤ pipi where 
( )
( ) β4* 2
2
+−−
−
=
suv
uvd .        (3.19) 
Proof: Difference of profit of the principal from (3.8e) and (3.14e) establishes the result. 
The principal will choose to outsource the project if it is more costly to do the task in-
house. Thus the make-or-buy decision depends on transaction costs of doing the task in-
house vs. outsourcing. In this case, the transaction cost of outsourcing is due to the IP 
misappropriation risk. If the inefficiency associated with in-house R&D exceeds a 
threshold d* then the task will be outsourced. Another explanation of the organizational 
choice is also possible. We note that  
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Consequently, if the level of penalty is higher than a threshold β~ , then the expected 
profit of the principal is higher under outsourcing.  
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3.7 Discussion 
 First, an interesting finding of this paper is that food processing companies can 
still gain from outsourcing even if there is possibility of IP misappropriation and 
shirking. In order to achieve the gains, however, it is important to design the incentive 
contracts in such a way that it is optimal for the supplier-contractor not to misappropriate 
and also exert effort on the outsourced task. Therefore we suggest that firms need not 
remain confined to inefficient internalization provided they can design the contracts 
appropriately. By forgoing outsourcing they might miss the efficiency from 
specialization and lower costs.   
 Second, our model suggests that the optimal incentive payments are higher in 
outsourcing vis-à-vis in-house, which might explain why food processing companies 
generally conduct R&D in-house (Grant Thornton, 2008). This is an outcome of the IP 
misappropriation problem and may be considered as a form of increased transaction cost 
of outsourcing. We note, however, that the expected profit of a company is higher under 
outsourcing due to the inefficiency associated with in-house organization. Thus a 
company faces a trade-off between increased transaction costs of outsourcing vs. 
inefficiency cost of doing tasks in-house.  
 Third, according to our paper, the principal is able to control the project by using 
a carrot and stick strategy. This result is along the lines of Ulset’s (1996) suggestion that 
firms should use contractual safeguards and high powered incentives to manage 
outsourced projects. In particular, the company must share less of its existing IP with the 
agent and ensure that the contractual payments are incentive compatible. Thus if tasks 
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are organized via outsourcing, information sharing with the supplier should be done 
strategically on a need-to-know basis. This reduced IP sharing strategy concurs with the 
findings of Kinsey and Ashman (2000) who suggest that retailers may share less 
information with their suppliers due to potential supplier opportunism. Once the 
suppliers learn about their inventory, sales, and ordering practices, they may share this 
information with rivals or otherwise use it in ways that would diminish retailers’ 
profitability. This eventually leads to reduced information sharing.  
 Fourth, we propose that the carrot and stick strategy may be used as a substitute 
for legal enforcement. Note that the outside option of the agent is decreasing in the 
penalty β . Although legal tools exist, lack of enforcement may render them ineffective 
in deterring misappropriation. Since litigation involves expenses and diverts managerial 
attention, it is advisable that companies pursue a defensive strategy by sharing less 
knowledge with their contract agents. In other words, manipulating the extent of IP 
sharing may be an effective strategy when contractual enforcement is uncertain.    
 Fifth, some authors have suggested the importance of trust in outsourcing 
relationships (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; Spaulding and Woods, 2006). Since product 
development tasks require confidentiality, they suggest that trust needs to be established 
between the company and the supplier. We recommend that contractual safeguards are 
also needed along with development of trust. Recall that the contractual solution 
developed in this paper comprises of lower IP sharing as well as higher incentive 
payments. While lower IP sharing by the principal is an outcome of lack of trust, the 
higher incentive payments might augment trust between the two parties.  
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 Sixth, according to our paper, in order to reduce the IP misappropriation risk, 
companies need to assess s, the value of their IP that they are sharing with their 
contractor. This quantitative valuation of IP is a necessary component of any risk 
assessment model that a company might have. Depending on the nature of IP, however, 
the valuation of intangible assets may be a difficult task. Therefore food processing 
companies ought to develop methodologies to assess the value of their IP before 
engaging in outsourcing.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 This paper addresses the practical problems faced by food processing companies 
that want to develop breakthrough innovation. They might lack some of the required 
expertise in-house and hence outsource R&D to outside contractors. However, the 
operational benefits of outsourcing come with two transaction risks due to a) IP 
misappropriation and b) shirking by the supplier-contractor. Therefore companies face 
an important tradeoff: organizing productive activities in-house involves higher cost due 
to loss of efficiency, whereas outsourcing leads to increased transaction cost due to IP 
loss. If companies are willing to outsource, then they must design contracts to implement 
a carrot and stick strategy developed in this chapter. We recommend that food 
processing companies need not relinquish the benefits of outsourcing if they can use 
contractual governance and appropriate IP management strategies. Indeed, companies 
that outsource and yet protect their brands successfully can do so because of proper 
management of their contractual relationships with their suppliers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TRADE SECRET THEFT OF LEXAR MEDIA: A SINGLE FIRM 
EVENT STUDY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 “Many factors could cause the market price of our common stock to fluctuate, 
including: announcements related to our outstanding litigation, and…market conditions 
in our industry and the economy as a whole.” -Excerpt from 10-Q Report filed by Lexar 
Media (2006).  
These two factors form the basis of event study methodology followed in this 
chapter. Outsourcing arrangements between companies often require extensive 
information/knowledge sharing among the transacting parties. This knowledge sharing 
can potentially lead to information leakage. In a knowledge based economy, loss of 
critical intellectual property (IP) can lead to adverse effects on the value of a company. 
This was the case when Lexar and Toshiba agreed to co-develop flash memory based 
technology. Lexar shared its key IP (to be discussed in details below) with Toshiba 
towards the joint development project. Eventually, Toshiba misappropriated the trade 
secrets and shared Lexar’s proprietary information with its rival SanDisk. What was the 
effect of this trade secret theft on Lexar’s value? How did it eventually manage to 
survive the trade secret theft? In order to reduce its manufacturing costs, Lexar is still 
pursuing outsourcing strategy to obtain flash memory, which is one of the primary inputs 
in flash memory card products. What does this case suggest for companies willing to 
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outsource while sharing IP with their supply chain partners? These are the key issues 
that we seek to address in this chapter.  
Event study technique is used to examine the effect of the IP litigation on Lexar 
value. Event studies are well suited to measure the impact of firm specific events on its 
value. Event analysis is also appropriate given the nature of events related to litigation. 
Stock market valuation of a firm is based on expectations of the stream of net income 
that the firm can generate from its tangible and intangible assets (Cockburn and 
Griliches, 1988). A company’s intangible assets like IP, R&D, goodwill, advertising, and 
marketing skills, dictate the survival and profitability of the company in the long run 
(Raghu et al., 2008). Market prices of securities reflect all publicly available information 
relevant to determining the expected cash flows and profits to the firm. New 
information, if any, contained in the commencement (or termination) of a litigation 
would cause the market to revise its expectations about the risks related to future cash 
flows and profits, and adjust the value of the firms accordingly. If the market is efficient, 
then these adjustments are immediately witnessed by changes in the stock prices of the 
firms (Raghu et al., 2008). While conducting the event study we address an important 
methodological issue related to the appropriateness of parametric tests in single firm 
event studies. A novel non-parametric test developed by Gelbach et al. (2009) is used to 
examine the stock market reaction to the event of trade secret theft as experienced by 
Lexar.  
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4.2 Company Background 
Lexar Media designs, develops, manufactures memory cards and connectivity products 
for digital photography, consumer electronics, and communication markets.2 Its digital 
media products include a variety of flash memory cards with a range of speeds, and 
capacities. The company’s products, including memory cards and flash drives, are used 
to store digital photos in cameras and music in MP3 players and phones.  
The company uses its patented NAND flash technology3 to manufacture Memory 
Stick, JumpDrive, and CompactFlash products. Lexar outsources key inputs like flash 
memory from Samsung, controllers from United Microelectronics Corporation and 
contracts with independent foundry and assembly units to manufacture the flash card 
products. This outsourcing strategy allows Lexar to focus on design of new products, 
which is its core competency. Outsourcing minimizes fixed cost and facilitates access to 
advanced manufacturing capabilities (Lexar Media, 2005). 
 
4.3 Description of Problem: Trade Secret Misappropriation  
Lexar had claimed that Toshiba, Japan's second biggest chipmaker, broke a 1997 
joint development agreement to co-develop flash memory technology, by secretly 
sharing its technology with SanDisk, Lexar’s largest competitor. As part of the 
agreement, Toshiba invested $3million in Lexar and received a seat in the company's 
board. For two and a half years, Toshiba retained its seat, and consequently gained 
                                               
2
 Micron acquired Lexar for approximately $850 million in 2006.  
 
3
 NAND flash is a type of memory that retains data even when its power supply is cut off.  
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access to Lexar’s technology. Toshiba persuaded Lexar to divulge its confidential 
technical and business information with promises of a long-term, strategic partnership. 
Toshiba was thus given access to details of Lexar’s key IP, flash memory controller 
technology4 (Multipage Write Technology), its business strategies, and other methods of 
achieving high performance flash devices. Each of these constitutes Lexar trade secrets, 
which the company shared with its outsourcing partner Toshiba. Eventually Toshiba 
divulged these trade secrets to SanDisk, and incorporated them into its own flash chips 
and flash systems (Lexar Media, 2005). It is important to note that Lexar’s IP is in the 
NAND die. Since the NAND die itself incorporates the trade secrets, Lexar sought an 
injunction on Toshiba products that incorporated them (Fair Disclosure Wire, 2005). 
Toshiba argued that it had independently developed the disputed technology, 
while the jury disagreed, saying Toshiba’s actions were “oppressive, fraudulent or 
malicious.” How important was the stolen IP for Toshiba? During the six-week trial, 
Lexar claimed that during the period of 1999-2004, Toshiba earned profits of $3.7 
billion using flash memory covered by its trade secrets. Also, a Toshiba document 
revealed as much as 50% of U.S sales might be attributed to Lexar’s IP.   
Following an epic litigation in 2005, Lexar was awarded $465.4 million in total. 
This was reportedly the largest IP verdict in California history and the third largest IP 
verdict in the U.S. Immediately after the conclusion of the litigation in its favor, Lexar 
shares traded at $5, more than 60 percent higher than the pre-verdict price. Later, in 
2006 Toshiba and Micron (the parent company of Lexar) settled the NAND flash 
                                               
4
 Flash memory controller technology acts like a “stoplight” to regulate the flow of data in a memory card.  
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memory related litigation. As part of the deal, valued at $288 million, Toshiba purchased 
certain Micron semiconductor technology and licensed patents formerly owned by Lexar 
Media. 
 
4.4 Chronology of Events  
 To keep track of the series of events that took place over a span of nine years, we 
present them chronologically below.  
1. In 1996, Toshiba invested $3 million in Lexar, gaining a 10 percent stake in the 
startup. At that time, Lexar was outsourcing flash memory component from Toshiba. 
2. In 1997 Lexar and Toshiba agreed to co-develop and use flash memory technology. 
Lexar shared its IP related to flash memory controller technology, and business 
strategies with Toshiba.  
3. On May10, 2000 a joint venture deal between Toshiba and SanDisk (a prime 
competitor of Lexar) was formally announced.   
4. In 2001, Toshiba published the technology that clarified use of Lexar’s intellectual 
property.  
5. On November 4, 2002, Lexar filed a lawsuit claiming that Toshiba had 
misappropriated its core IP. 
7. Trial began on February 7, 2005. 
8. On March 23, 2005 the jury concluded that Toshiba Corporation and Toshiba America 
Electronic Components Inc. misappropriated Lexar’s trade secret. Lexar was awarded 
$381.4 million. 
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9. On March 24, 2005, the jury awarded an additional $84 million in punitive damages. 
 
4.5 Literature Review  
 Event studies have often been used as evidence for damages and liabilities in 
litigation. In addition to direct monetary costs, litigations can lead to indirect costs such 
as management distraction and difficulty in obtaining credit (Raghu et al., 2008). Such 
high indirect costs cause market participants to reevaluate the litigating firms’ market 
valuation. Event studies are thus naturally suitable for examining capital market 
reactions to litigation announcements. Carr and Gorman (2001) used event study 
analysis to examine the stock market effect of trade secret theft. Raghu et al. (2008) 
investigate the factors that could affect the market’s reactions to patent infringement 
litigations in the IT industry. They found that R&D intensity, average age of patents (i.e. 
how new is the invention), and patent importance (measured by citations) are some of 
the factors that affect market reaction to IT patent litigations.  
Another application of event studies relates to understanding the effect of 
announcement of an outsourcing decision on company valuation. For instance, Agrawal 
et al. (2006) found that companies that outsourced E-business projects achieved 
abnormal positive returns. Likewise, pharmaceutical companies that outsource R&D 
through acquisitions tend to realize significant positive returns (Higgins and Rodriguez, 
2006). Oh et al. (2006) examined stock market data to assess investors’ responses to 
various transactional risks associated with IT outsourcing. They find that several factors 
significantly influence investors' perceptions of the risks involved in IT outsourcing. 
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These factors include the size of outsourcing contracts, difficulties in performance 
monitoring, asset specificity of IT resources, vendor capability, and the lack of cultural 
similarity between client and vendor firms. Results indicate that investors will ‘bid up’ 
the stock prices of firms that are able to pursue low-risk outsourcing engagements, while 
punishing firms that become entangled in outsourcing contracts posing a high level of 
risk. 
 
4.6 Research Questions  
 Our research question is how did the event of trade secret theft by Toshiba affect 
the value of Lexar? In particular, we want to measure the effect on the stock returns of 
Lexar around the beginning of litigation as well as around the day the litigation was 
settled. While doing so, we also address a critical question related to the methodological 
aspect of event studies with single firm. It is well known that standard t-tests might not 
be valid in single firm event studies. Gelbach et al. (2009) propose a novel test that does 
not require the assumption of normality of abnormal returns. We use this test along with 
the usual parametric tests to make statistical inferences.  
 
4.7 Event Study Methodology 
 We utilize event study methodology to assess the effect of trade secret 
misappropriation by Toshiba on the value of Lexar. Use of the event study method is 
appropriate given the firm specific nature of the event, as quite often done in legal 
liability cases to assess damages (Campbell et al., 1997). Event studies are based on 
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econometric techniques to estimate and draw inferences about the impact of an event in 
a particular period or over several periods. It is generally believed that stock prices of 
publicly traded companies accurately reflect its true value. When any new information is 
publicly disclosed, investors revise their beliefs and consequently stock prices change to 
reflect the consensus view regarding the fair value of a firm (Carr and Gorman, 2001).  
The implicit assumption in this methodology is that financial markets respond to 
event/news that affect a security’s value, so a change in stock price is a good proxy for 
the impact of a given event. It relies on the theory of efficient markets, according to 
which security prices incorporate at each instant all currently available information and 
adjusts to new information whenever investors get the (new) information. Thus, a loss of 
trade secret might lead to financial losses (through loss of reputation, brand value) which 
would be reflected in its stock price. The economic impact of this event can be examined 
by looking at the stock prices in the event window. 
Event studies have been widely used by researchers to investigate the market 
effects of litigation (Raghu et al., 2008). One can potentially isolate causal effects of 
isolated events (e.g. corporate governance adoption, announcement of outsourcing, IP 
litigation) through event studies. A study by Mitchell (1989) on Tylenol poisoning in 
1982 is relevant in the context of this research. Not only it was a single firm event study, 
just like ours, two event periods were considered in order to examine: a) investors’ initial 
reaction to the poisonings, and b) the subsequent recovery of Johnson and Johnson. As 
Mitchell explains, information about product poisonings would affect investors’ belief 
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about how consumers would react to Johnson and Johnson products. After forming an 
initial prediction, investors realized that they had been wrong about their initial  
forecast regarding response of consumers to Johnson and Johnson products.  
The methodology involves three steps: (1) compute the parameters in the 
estimation period; (2) compute the forecast errors for an event window; and (3) 
aggregate across time and infer about the average effect of the event. Broadly speaking, 
events reflecting negative (positive) news would lead to decrease (increase) in firm’s 
stock price (Carr and Gorman, 2001). 
 
4.7.1 Identification of Event(s)  
 For this study there are two events that are potentially relevant. These are: a) 
commencement of litigation and b) litigation termination with announcement of 
judgment by the court. The start of the litigation on February7, 2005 conveyed 
information to the public about the loss of trade secret of Lexar. In order to 
accommodate a time lag for the news to propagate, we consider the following calendar 
date (02/08/2005) as the event date. Although the litigation ended on March 23, 2005, 
the jury awarded additional $84 million as punitive damages the next day. To 
accommodate this additional reward, we consider 03/24/2005 as the second event date 
for the purpose of this study.  
 
4.7.2 Abnormal Returns (AR)  
 The crux of an event study depends on analyzing the behavior of the abnormal  
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returns (AR). Normal return of a security is defined as the return that would be expected 
in the absence of the event under consideration. Abnormal returns are subsequently 
defined as the actual ex-post return of the security over the event window less the normal 
return of the firm over the event window (Campbell et al., 1997). Abnormal returns are 
prediction errors of the market model (described in details in the following section) over 
the event window. It is assumed that the abnormal returns are the result of the event 
announcements and not some other random event occurring on the same day (Subramani 
and Walden, 2000). 
 
4.7.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 CAR gives us an idea about investors’ beliefs about a firm's value following an 
event under consideration. Positive CAR signify that investors on an average perceive 
that the event will result in future cash flows. Negative CAR, on the other hand would 
occur when investors are pessimistic about the impact of the event on future cash flows.  
 
4.7.4 Market Model  
 Following the extant literature, we use the market model to examine the effect of 
the IP litigation event on Lexar stock price. The model assumes a stable linear 
relationship between the market return (Rmτ) and the return of the security (Rτ). It is 
assumed that the coefficients are constant during the estimation and event periods. 
Formally, the market model is  
τττ εβα +⋅+= mRR , with [ ] [ ] 2var,0 σεε ==E      (4.1) 
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where τ indicates time in estimation window andε is a white noise random component 
that is uncorrelated with Rm. For Rm, the market index, there are several alternative 
indices to choose from. The Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) provides 
returns for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of all available stocks each 
trading period. The equal-weighted market return is a simple average of the returns of all 
traded stocks (http://www.library.hbs.edu/helpsheets/wrdscrspstock.html). The value-
weighted market return is a weighted average of all stock returns, with the weights given 
by the market value of the stock issue (price times shares outstanding) at the end of the 
previous trading period. Finally, the most commonly used index is the S&P 500, a 
capitalization-weighted index based on a broad cross-section of the market. We use all 
of these three alternative indices to check for robustness of our findings. Under general 
conditions OLS estimates of the parameters are consistent and efficient (Campbell et al., 
1997). We estimate (4.1) to obtain the abnormal returns as differences of realized and 
predicted returns at date τ in the event window. Formally,  
[ ]τττττ ε mRRERRA −== ˆˆ         (4.2) 
where τ indicates time in event window. 
Abnormal return is the part of the actual return that cannot be explained by market 
movements. Thus ARτ is the excess return of a security after extracting the market factor.   
 
4.7.5 Selection of Estimation Window 
 The estimation period provides the parameter estimates used to obtain CAR in 
the event window.  In order to ensure that returns realized during the estimation period 
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are typical and representative of performance prior to the event, we took the estimation 
window to be of length 242 trading days and ending 11 days before the first event, i.e. 
the start of litigation. This estimation window is consistent with the works of Carr and 
Gorman (2001), Oh et al. (2006), and Agrawal et al. (2006), among others.  Figure 2 
shows the time line of the event study. The estimation window is [To, T1] with a length 
of M days. The event window is (T1, T2] with a length of L days. 
  
 To Length= M        T1        Length= L          T2 
Figure 2.  Estimation Window and Event Window 
 
 
4.7.6 Selection of Event Window 
 We want to examine whether mean abnormal returns for periods around the 
event are equal to zero. To do so, we need to select an appropriate event window. If the 
event is partially anticipated, some of the abnormal return behavior related to the event 
might show up in the pre-event period. Also, in testing market efficiency, the speed of 
adjustment to the information revealed at the time of the event is an empirical question 
(Binder, 1998). Researchers prefer shorter event periods for a better estimation of the 
effects of information on stock prices since it reduces the possibility of confounding 
effects of other announcements not related to the event of interest. In addition to this 
Event 
Window 
Estimation 
Window 
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benefit, it also increases the power of the tests. Longer event windows may severely 
reduce the power of the test statistic, thereby leading to false inferences about the 
significance of an event. Finally, the market might have acquired information prior to the 
actual announcement of the litigation or its results. To accommodate the possibility of 
any information leakage, researchers take [- t, + t] as the event window, assuming that 
the event occurred at t = 0. For instance, Carr and Gorman (2001) calculates the AR for 
[-10, +10] centered around the event date. Raghu et al. (2008) used similar approach but 
considered shorter event windows. Mitchell (1989), on the other hand, calculated the AR 
for [0, 21] days after the event.  
We consider three symmetric event windows [-3, +3], [-2, +2] and [-1, +1] 
around each of the two event dates. Following the extant literature, we searched the 
LexisNexis Academic Database near the dates of the announcements to see if there were 
any confounding announcements related to the companies involved in litigation. This 
was done to eliminate any confounding factors that might have affected abnormal 
returns in the event window. 
 
4.7.7 Parametric Test for Significance of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 In order to draw inferences, we test the statistical significance of estimated 
AR for different sampling intervals within the event window. To that end, cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated for event window [T1, T2] as follows: 
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It is conjectured that when an event occurs, market participants may revise their beliefs 
causing a shift in the firm’s return generating process. The null hypothesis is that the 
event has no impact on the cumulative abnormal returns of Lexar. To put it formally,  
( ) 0,ˆ: 210 =TTRACH          (4.4) 
Event studies typically use parametric Patell test. The test statistic is  
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where M is the length of the estimation window, p is the number of explanatory 
variables in the abnormal return regression (4.1) and SCAR is Standardized Cumulative 
Abnormal Return. SCAR is computed as follows 
( ) ( )( )212
21
21
,
,
ˆ
,
ˆ
TTS
TTRAC
TTRASC =          (4.6) 
where ( )212 ,TTS = ( )],ˆvar[ 21 TTRAC denotes the variance of estimated CAR. 
If we assume independence among estimated AR over the event window, then  
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and
2
ˆˆ2
−
′
=
M
εε
σ is the residual variance estimated from the OLS regression (4.1). 
Evidently this standard error depends on M, the length of the estimation window. Thus 
longer estimation windows lead to low standard errors.  
From (4.7) as the length of the event window increases, i.e. L
 
→ ∞, one may use  
( ) 2212 , σ⋅= LTTS          (4.9) 
Under the null hypothesis of no event effect, the test statistic SCAR follows t 
distribution with M-2 degrees of freedom. If we assume that estimated AR are 
intertemporally uncorrelated, the variance of CAR is estimated as the sum of the 
variances of the individual AR. Such an assumption relies on the weak form of the 
efficient markets hypothesis, according to which the true AR are intertemporally 
uncorrelated. However, since estimated AR are based on market model parameters, it is 
a nothing but a forecast error, not a true error. The same market model parameter 
estimates enter into the calculation of all AR for a firm. Consequently, the estimated AR 
would be correlated with each other. It is well known in the econometrics literature 
(Theil, 1971, pp. 122–123) that prediction errors have greater variance than the 
regression disturbances, since prediction errors are a function of estimation error in the 
parameters as well as disturbance variance (Binder, 1998). Salinger (1992), Mikkelson 
and Partch (1988) provide a corrected formula of variance of estimated CAR that 
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considers the intertemporal correlation between the estimated abnormal returns. 
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As pointed out by Binder (1998), the parametric tests reject too often when testing for 
positive abnormal performance and too seldom when testing for negative abnormal 
performance. This is an important fact to keep in mind while making inferences using 
parametric tests. There is another problem in using parametric test for a single firm event 
study. As Brown and Warner (1985) note, daily stock return for an individual security 
exhibits substantial departures from normality. Distributions of daily returns tend to be 
fat-tailed and right skewed relative to a normal distribution (Fama, 1976).The Central 
Limit Theorem (CLT) ensures that if the excess returns in a cross-section of securities 
are independent and identically distributed drawings from finite variance distributions, 
then the distribution of the sample mean excess return would converge to normality as 
the number of securities increases. However, in a single firm event study we cannot use 
this result and hence non parametric tests are necessary.  
 
4.7.8 Non-Parametric Test for Significance of Abnormal Returns 
 When the assumption of normality of abnormal returns is violated, parametric 
tests are not well specified. Non-parametric tests are well-specified and more powerful at 
detecting a false null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. 
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4.7.9 Dummy Variable/Event Parameter Approach 
 In the traditional approach the market model parameters are estimated over a 
period that excludes the event dates. Then in the second stage, the abnormal returns are 
estimated as prediction errors from the market model. An alternative to this method is 
the so called event parameter/dummy variable approach. In this method, the market 
model includes the event dates. The model is augmented with event specific dummy 
variables which allow joint estimation of the market model parameters and the abnormal 
returns. Since our case study involves two event dates, we augment the market model 
with two dummy variables as follows.  
τττττ γγβα eDDRR m +⋅+⋅+⋅+= 2211       (4.11) 
In this equation, τ includes the two event dates. The dummy variable D1 is equal to 1 at 
the start of litigation and 0 otherwise; and D2 is 1 at the end of litigation and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficients γ1 and γ2 estimates the impacts of the two events on returns of Lexar. 
These two coefficient(s) are also the abnormal return(s) on the two event dates. 
However, the validity of using t statistic for a single firm study remains questionable, a 
la Gelbach et al. (2009). If γ1 and γ2 were Normally distributed then under null we could 
use usual t-test to examine the effects of the events. However, as Gelbach et al. (2009) 
explains, CLT holds when γi can be written as a sample mean of large number of 
observations since sample mean is asymptotically normal. But when there is a single 
firm, gamma cannot be written as a sample mean of many observations. Therefore a non 
parametric test is used to examine the event effect of trade secret loss experienced by 
Lexar. Formally, the null hypothesis is  
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HO: 021 == γγ           (4.12) 
The alternate hypothesis is that the start of litigation will lead to negative abnormal 
returns and the end of litigation with a favorable ruling for Lexar will lead to positive 
abnormal returns.  
HA: 12 0 γγ >>          (4.13) 
The test developed by Gelbach et al. (2009) is as follows. 
i) Obtain OLS estimates of the parameters for equation (4.11). 
ii) Obtain the fitted abnormal returns eˆ and rank them in increasing order. 
iii) For a level α test define 
α
eˆ and 
α−1eˆ  as the sample √α and (1-√α) quantiles 
of the distribution of fitted abnormal returns. 
iv) Rejection rule for the test: reject HO against HA if and only if both 
α
γ eˆˆ1 ≤ and 
α
γ
−
≥ 1
2
ˆˆ e        (4.14) 
 
4.8 Hypotheses Development 
 Generally speaking, there could be several factors leading to fluctuation in 
market price of Lexar’s common stock. The annual 10-K report filed by the company 
outlines these broad factors (Lexar Media, 2005): 
• announcements of technological innovations by Lexar or its competitors; 
• introduction of new products or new pricing policies by Lexar or its competitors; 
• announcements related to outstanding litigation; and  
• market conditions in the industry and the economy as a whole. 
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 We discuss the factors that investors might take into consideration while forming 
their beliefs about the stock price of Lexar. If they anticipate that Lexar might not be 
profitable in the future, stock prices would be negatively affected. There are risks of 
several kinds that could lead to negative sentiment among investors. Lexar’s profitability 
depends on the cost of its components for producing flash memory products and the rate 
of price decrease for its products in order to sustain the “irrational” price cutting strategy 
followed by its key competitors like Toshiba and SanDisk (Lexar Media, 2005). It also 
depends on the growth of the markets for digital cameras or other devices that need 
digital storage media produced by Lexar. Hence stock prices are determined by 
expectations related to market acceptance of Lexar products and its ability to charge a 
premium price for its high performance products. In part these expectations also 
depended on the license revenue that Lexar can earn from its IP. Therefore news 
pertaining to IP misappropriation would cause negative expectations among investors 
since IP theft can lead to loss of sales and market share. It can also lead to reduced 
average selling prices, resulting in further loss of revenues. Consequently a loss of IP 
would lead to lower shareholder and market value. In the spate of adverse expectations 
on Lexar’s profitability, the market price of its common stock would decline 
significantly. Indeed, as pointed out in Lexar media (2005):  
“If we are unable to generate increased revenue from licensing our intellectual property, 
our gross margins and results of operations would be negatively impacted. Therefore if 
the loss of IP is serious, it could have great ramifications on the competitive advantage 
of Lexar.”  
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Consequently, an initial announcement of trade secret loss would adversely affect 
investors’ belief about the value of Lexar. If the competitors of Lexar can produce 
similar products with the misappropriated IP then customers might choose non Lexar 
products if they are cheaper. Thus IP loss would lead to reduced future income for Lexar 
and consequently, a depreciation of abnormal returns. If the loss of trade secret hampers 
the ability of Lexar to design and manufacture products that are technologically superior 
from its competitors, then it would lose its brand value. Thus the start of litigation would 
impact investor’s confidence adversely. Investors might belief that the loss of trade 
secret would lead to fall in future cash flows of Lexar. We would expect in the presence 
of negative factors enumerated above, that a news regarding start of litigation would 
affect stock prices of Lexar adversely. Thus our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis1 
The market price of Lexar’s stock may decline if investors believe that loss of IP would 
be critical for the company’s profitability in the future. Loss of IP would adversely affect 
Lexar’s ability to secure licensing revenue from potential licensees and consequently 
have a negative impact on its stock. Initial announcement of trade secret theft litigation 
would lead to negative abnormal returns for Lexar.  
Though the market may be monitoring the progress of the litigation and update 
forecasts of the firm’s prospects, the termination may still contain new information 
which is unanticipated by the markets (Raghu et al., 2008).  How the market will react to 
a decision also depends on the importance of Lexar’s IP. In 2004, Lexar had an 
agreement with Kodak to sell flash cards under the Kodak brand. With worldwide brand 
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recognition, Kodak complemented Lexar’s core IP. This validates the importance of 
Lexar’s IP to a large extent. If customers have faith in Lexar brand, they would not shy 
away from the Lexar products. Given this brand recognition among its customers, an end 
in litigation in favor of Lexar would lead to positive abnormal returns. Thus we have our 
second hypothesis of this event study. 
Hypothesis2 
A termination of litigation in favor of Lexar would assure investors as well as customers 
about the company’s core IP. To the extent the investors’ confidence is restored, they 
will update their belief about the value of Lexar. This might increase the demand for its 
product and hence we would expect positive abnormal returns for Lexar.  An 
unfavorable outcome, on the other hand, could lead to a decline in Lexar stock price and 
negative abnormal returns.  
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4.9 Data  
 The data were obtained from CRSP database provided by Wharton Research 
Data Services. We use daily data on volume, outstanding number of shares and stock 
market return of Lexar Media (NASDAQ:LEXR). For market return index, three 
variables were considered: the value weighted portfolio market return, equally weighted 
portfolio return and S&P 500. News related to the event dates and 10-K, 10-Q reports 
were accessed using LexisNexis Academic database.  
 
4.10 Results 
4.10.1 Parametric Tests  
 We consider event 1 as the start of litigation on February 8, 2005. This 
corresponds to t = 0. Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of regression (4.1). The 
estimation window is [-252,-11]. 
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Table 4. Coefficient Estimates(a) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Event1: 
Start of Litigation 
 
 
Independent 
variable  
(Rm) 
Intercept  
(αˆ ) 
Slope 
( βˆ ) 
Event 
Window 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
(CAR) 
Patell Z(b) P value(c) 
[-3,+3] -11.66% -1.048 0.1474 
[-2,+2] -3.18% -0.339 0.3673 
CRSP(d) 
Equally 
Weighted/ 
S&P 500(e) 
-0.00299 2.5** 
[-1,+1] -1.08% -0.15 0.4404 
[-3,+3] -11.84% -1.074 0.1415 
[-2,+2] -3.11% -0.336 0.3686 
CRSP Value 
Weighted 
 
-0.00328 2.57** 
[-1,+1] -0.96% -0.133 0.447 
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
(a)  Estimates of equation 4.1 where the dependent variable is Lexar stock return 
(b) Cumulative window Z statistics are adjusted for serial dependence for the Patell test 
(c)
 Tests are one sided 
(d)
 CRSP denotes Center for Research on Securities Prices 
(e)  S&P 500 denotes Standard & Poor's 500 Index 
 
Table 4 provides the cumulative abnormal returns of Lexar for three event windows:  
[-1, +1], [-2, +2] and [-3, +3]. Cumulative abnormal returns after the start of litigation 
were negative. The result is robust to the choice of Rm and the event window. However, 
we note that the CAR are not statistically significant using the parametric test. This 
result is robust to the choice of Rm and the event window.  
 We consider event 2 as the end of litigation on March 24, 2005. This corresponds 
to t = 32. As before, the estimation window is [-252,-11]. 
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Table 5. Coefficient Estimates(a) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Event 2: End 
of Litigation 
 
Independent 
variable  
(Rm) 
Intercept  
(αˆ ) 
Slope 
( βˆ ) 
Event 
Window 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
(CAR) 
Patell Z(b) P value(c) 
[+29,+35] 94.43% 8.491 <.0001 
[+30,+34] 83.38% 8.902 <.0001 
CRSP(d) 
Equally 
Weighted/ 
S&P 500(e) 
-0.00299 2.5** 
[+31,+33] 82.83% 11.46 <.0001 
[+29,+35] 94.97% 8.615 <.0001 
[+30,+34] 84.67% 9.123 <.0001 
CRSP Value 
Weighted 
-0.00328 2.57** 
[+31,+33] 83.15% 11.604 <.0001 
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
(a)  Estimates of equation 4.1 where the dependent variable is Lexar stock return 
(b) Cumulative window Z statistics are adjusted for serial dependence for the Patell test 
(c)
 Tests are one sided 
(d)
 CRSP denotes Center for Research on Securities Prices 
(e)  S&P 500 denotes Standard & Poor's 500 Index 
 
Table 5 shows that around the end of litigation, Lexar stock exhibited statistically 
significant positive CAR. The result is robust to the choice of Rm and the event window.  
 
4.10.2 Non Parametric Test  
 Equation (4.11) is estimated using data encompassing both estimation and event 
window as previously defined. OLS estimates of the coefficients on the event dummy 
variables give us the estimated event effects directly. The dummy variable D1 is 1 for the 
event 1 date February 8, 2005 and 0 otherwise. The variable D2 is 1 for the event 2 date 
March 24, 2005. We report the results with S&P 500 as the index for Rm. Regressions 
using CRSP value and equally weighted indices yield similar results and are therefore 
not reported here. Table 6 provides the OLS estimates of equation (4.11). The CAR and 
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standard error of CAR are numerically identical to the conventional approach (Salinger, 
1992) and hence not reported. 
 
Table 6.  Coefficient Estimates(a) of Equation (4.11) 
 
 Estimated Coefficient t statistic P value 
Intercept (αˆ ) -0.005 -1.608 .109 
Slope ( βˆ ) 2.143 5.028** .000 
Litigation start dummy ( 1γˆ ) -0.031 -0.617 .537 
Litigation end dummy ( 2γˆ ) 1 .000 19.997** .000 
        **Statistically significant at 5% level, Adjusted R2=0.59, Durbin Watson =2.09 
            (a) The dependent variable is Lexar stock return 
 
Although the signs are as expected, we find no statistical significance of event 1: Start of 
Trial. On the other hand, event 2: End of Trial had significant positive effect on value of 
Lexar. However, as has been pointed out by Gelbach et al. (2009), the assumption of 
normality of abnormal returns is questionable with single firm event study. Therefore we 
apply the non parametric test described above in (4.14).  
 We choose a level α (=0.05) test. For n = 289 and √α = 0.2236, we obtain 
the [ ]n⋅α , or 64th order statistic from the sample of fitted abnormal returns. We obtain 
α
eˆ = -0.01757 and
α−1eˆ  , which is the 224
th
 order statistic = 0.023229.  We recall the 
rejection rule for test: reject HO against HA if and only if both αγ eˆˆ1 ≤ and αγ −≥ 12 ˆˆ e . 
From Table 6 above, we see that both of these required conditions are met. Hence we 
can reject the null in favor of the alternate hypothesis. Thus we can infer that CAR at the 
start of event 1 is significantly negative and CAR at event 2 is significantly positive. The 
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regression results imply that the magnitude of CAR at the start of litigation was -3.1% 
and CAR at the end of litigation was 100%. Following Lys and Vincent (1995) 
methodology, these abnormal returns translate to an estimated total wealth loss of Lexar 
shareholders of $9.2 million at the start of litigation. This is obtained by multiplying 
Lexar’s Abnormal Return of -3.1% by the pre-event 1 price (on February 7, 2005) of 
$3.76 and 79,235,000 shares outstanding. At the termination of litigation, however, the 
shareholder wealth increased by $252.7 million, which is obtained by multiplying the 
pre-event 2 Lexar price of $3.17 and 79,701,000 shares outstanding.  
For event 1: start of litigation, the parametric test yields expected (negative) sign 
of the CAR but the results are not statistically different from zero. According to the non 
parametric test, however, there was a statistically significant abnormal decline in the 
value of Lexar. The non parametric test lends support to Hypothesis1. 
Both parametric and non parametric tests lead to the same inference on the effect 
of event 2: end of litigation. This validates our second hypothesis. Lexar stock price 
exhibited positive CAR following the end of litigation which ruled in favor of Lexar. 
The result is statistically significant, using both non parametric and parametric tests.  
We can infer two things from these statistical tests. First, the market received the 
news of trade secret theft negatively at the beginning. Once the uncertainty was resolved 
at the end of litigation, investors updated their belief about the IP and value of Lexar. 
Since the core IP of Lexar was validated by the “epic” litigation, Lexar stock price  
exhibited statistically positive cumulative abnormal returns after the end of litigation.  
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4.11 Findings Related to Existing Literature  
 Previous empirical works in the area reveal that litigations cause markets to 
reevaluate the firms. Filing of litigations generally led to a 2–3.1% average decrease in 
the market value of the firms involved (Bhagat et al., 1994; Lerner, 1994). The results 
are comparable with a CAR of -3.1% for Lexar following the start of litigation.   
The termination of litigation with a favorable ruling reveals the validity of the 
firm’s ownership of its intellectual property. Existing literature shows that stock price for 
prevailing appellate plaintiffs tend to have positive effects on the day of the decision 
(Lunney 2005). The results found in this event study corroborates with this finding. At 
the end of litigation, the stock prices of Lexar exhibited a significantly positive CAR of 
100%. 
 
4.12 Discussion 
 The IP misappropriation problem is embedded within the outsourcing strategy 
pursued by Lexar.  The company has been outsourcing an essential input, flash memory, 
from Toshiba in order to produce its flash memory products. Lexar had to share its 
critical intellectual property (i.e. flash memory controller technology) with its 
outsourcing partner, Toshiba. This knowledge sharing was imperative following an 
agreement in 1997 to co-develop the flash memory technology. The knowledge/trade 
secret sharing on the part of Lexar ultimately proved to be futile when Toshiba shared 
the information with SanDisk, a major competitor of Lexar.  
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 What was the effect on Toshiba due to this event? Toshiba being a private 
company we were unable to examine the effects using event study. However, the end of 
litigation in favor of Lexar pointed to the fact that Toshiba had indeed misappropriated 
the IP and used it for its own benefit. When Toshiba and SanDisk announced their 
partnership to produce what is called Multi Level Cell Technology, Lexar argued that it 
would not be financially viable without Lexar’s IP, i.e. Multipage Write Technology. 
Not only Toshiba had incorporated Lexar’s IP in several of its products, it had also 
adopted a significant price cutting strategy in due course. It might be argued that Toshiba 
was able to use this strategy because the trade secrets from Lexar helped it reduce its 
cost of producing the products. As pointed out in the 2005 Quarter 1 earning conference 
of Lexar, the irrational price cut by Toshiba and SanDisk might be attributed to the trade 
secret stolen from Lexar. Indeed, it would have taken several months of time and effort 
to develop similar technology without infringing on Lexar’s core technology (Fair 
Disclosure Wire, 2005). 
Lexar operates in an industry that is subject to rapid technological changes, fast 
changes in consumer demand and continuous introduction of new, higher performance 
products with short product life cycles. In the recent years, prices of Lexar products have 
fallen faster than the cost of its inputs, particularly the cost of flash memory. The 
industry is characterized by aggressive pricing strategies with an average 30 to 40 
percent price decline each year. Lexar had to outsource a critical component, flash 
memory, from Toshiba.  It was precisely the channel that led to eventual 
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misappropriation of its IP. Lexar ultimately survived the IP misappropriation problem by 
using the following business strategies.  
As a brand, the key thing that Lexar offers is quality and design of its products. It 
had a 31% market share in the booming flash drive market (Businessweek, 2003). While 
consumers trust this brand, it ought to remain competitive on the price front. Despite 
robust demand for digital products from the consumers, Lexar has been unable to cut its 
costs enough to keep up with retail price cuts. In the first quarter of 2005, Lexar had 
announced that it would focus on profitability. It reduced the number of promotional 
programs and maintained a price higher than its competitors. Apparently this strategy did 
not prove successful as it resulted in a decrease in rate of revenue growth and a loss of 
market share during 2005 (Lexar Media, 2006). During late 2005, in an effort to return 
to profitability, Lexar’s action plan included launching more of premium-differentiated 
products including its Platinum Series of cards and the new JumpDrive Lightning, which 
offered superior data transfer speed (Fair Disclosure Wire, 2005). 
Many of the competitors of Lexar (e.g. SanDisk) manufacture their own 
controllers and/or flash memory in-house. This is in contrast to the outsourcing strategy 
followed by Lexar since its inception. Since Samsung and Toshiba dominate the market 
for high density flash memory, the price of this key input is expected to remain high in 
the future. Unless Lexar was able to introduce new, differentiated products with higher 
average selling prices, its revenue and gross margins would be negatively impacted. As a 
response to the price cutting strategy by its competitors, Lexar had to decrease the prices 
of its products as well. In order to retain its market share, its strategy was to 
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continuously bring new products and better versions of existing products. A significant 
part of its revenues come from its JumpDrive flash storage products. For this kind of 
products, design has become an important selling feature unlike other flash cards which 
have fixed dimensions and specifications. Therefore Lexar used a strategy to 
differentiate its JumpDrive products. In order to do so, it continuously developed 
innovative designs for new flash storage products that would appeal to a broad group of 
customers.  
In addition to the product differentiation strategy, in 2004, Lexar entered into an 
exclusive, multi-year agreement with Kodak whereby it sells digital media to customers 
under the Kodak brand name. By using brand power and global distribution network of 
Kodak, Lexar was able to gain a significant share of the market for removable digital 
memory products. Also, the company continued to develop premium differentiated 
products to capture the professional photography market.  
 
4.13 Conclusion 
 The ability of a company to benefit from its IP depends on the vulnerability of 
the IP, i.e. how difficult it is for the competitors to imitate the technology (Gilbert and 
Shapiro, 1990). Product differentiation might be a key strategy to survive in the 
electronic goods industry. Indeed, Lexar survived the trade secret theft largely because it 
continued investing in innovative new products. In particular, it developed products with 
enhanced attributes like larger memory capacity, greater writing speed and smaller size 
to render the new products compatible with the changing needs of its customers, 
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particularly the professional photographers. In addition, by selling products under the 
Kodak brand name, the company was able to increase its market share. This case study 
on Lexar underlines the importance of investing in product differentiation that helped it 
stay in the business even after losing its IP. 
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CHAPTER V 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
As firms outsource supply chain activities, they face agency problems due to ex-
post opportunistic actions of their contractors. Two significant risks in supply chain 
outsourcing involve IP misappropriation and shirking by contractors. A description of 
these risks and the contributions of this dissertation in terms of mitigating these risks are 
summarized as follows.  
 The first type of risk involves the protection of IP while engaging with supply 
chain contractors. Modern enterprises derive significant value from their IP. The recent 
occurrences of IP theft under outsourcing have motivated companies, practitioners and 
researchers to find better ways to manage risk of IP theft.  
The existing literature addresses the protection of IP that is created within an 
outsourcing relationship. When R&D is created by the contractor, contractual safeguards 
like exclusivity clauses are commonly used and high powered incentives are provided by 
assigning some of the property rights to the contractor. The allocation of property rights 
provides appropriate incentive to the contractor to not misappropriate the IP. Lai et al. 
(2009) find that a revenue sharing contract provides greater incentive than a fixed price 
contract to avoid the IP misappropriation problem. Ho (2009) considers a similar 
problem under uncertainty in innovation outcome. She finds that in the presence of 
uncertainty, if a single contractor is hired, then it is not possible to deter the IP 
misappropriation problem.    
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 In contrast to the extant literature, the focus of this dissertation is on the 
protection of the pre-existing IP of a firm. The real life examples described in Chapter I 
reveal that pre-existing IP plays an important role in the misappropriation problem. 
Firms possess a portfolio of IP which they share with their contractor/service provider. 
Knowledge disclosure by the principal firm can affect the outsourcing project in 
different ways. Two alternative situations are considered in this dissertation. In Chapter 
II, it is assumed that knowledge sharing by the principal firm enables a contractor to 
learn the technology and then use the IP towards its own benefit. In Chapter III, the 
knowledge sharing by the principal firm is assumed to affect the probability distribution 
of the project returns. In either case, while the principal shares its pre-existing 
knowledge to facilitate the project, the contractor may misappropriate the shared 
information towards its own benefit. This ex-post opportunistic action by the contractor 
comprises the first agency problem in outsourcing relationship.  
The existing literature confines attention to only one kind of IP misappropriation 
problem. For example, Lai et al. (2009), and Ho (2009) addresses the problem where a 
contractor produces R&D and then sells the innovation output to a competitor of the 
principal. In this dissertation, two manifestations of the IP misappropriation risk are 
considered. In Chapter II, a contractor may use the IP of the principal to emerge as a 
direct competitor of the principal in the final product market. This type of IP 
misappropriation has occurred in biotech, pharmaceutical, footwear, automotive, 
semiconductor and electronic goods industries. In Chapter III, the contractor sells the 
shared IP to a competitor of the principal. This form of IP misappropriation risk is 
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observed in the software, semiconductor, and food processing industry. Both of these 
possibilities have occurred in reality, as described at length in Chapter I. Hence the 
solutions offered in this dissertation are applicable to any form of IP misappropriation 
problem that might occur in outsourcing.  
 The second type of risk occurs when a task is outsourced; it becomes difficult 
for the principal firm to control the actions of the contractor. Thus it is impossible for a 
firm to detect whether a bad project outcome is due to shirking by the contractor or 
because of natural shocks. Consequently the principal firm faces a moral hazard problem 
due to unobservable and unverifiable effort exerted by a contractor on the outsourced 
project. Depending on the nature of outsourcing project, shirking can lead to adverse 
consequences for the principal firm. If the task is contract manufacturing, shirking may 
lead to poor quality product and/or higher than planned costs; if the outsourced task is 
R&D, shirking can lead to suboptimal research outcomes.   
 The existing literature does not provide any insight on how to mitigate both of 
these risks in outsourcing. In Chapters II and III of this dissertation, contractual solutions 
are developed to mitigate the two agency problems associated with outsourcing. It is 
demonstrated how firms can protect their IP even if there is a potential threat of IP 
misappropriation by their supply chain contractors. Incentive contracts are designed to 
implement a “carrot and stick” strategy. In particular, it is recommended that firms 
should disclose their pre-existing IP with their contractors only on a “need to know” 
basis. This may be accomplished by breaking the R&D project into modules and sharing 
only selective knowledge with the contractor. The limited knowledge sharing reduces 
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the profit of the contractor that it could have received by walking away from the 
contract. This weakens its outside option and therefore the contractor stays within the 
contractual relation. Thus the “stick” strategy enables a firm to deter the first agency 
problem due to IP misappropriation. As the contractor decides to stay within the 
contractual relationship, the principal faces the second agency problem due to moral 
hazard with respect to effort exerted by the contractor. When effort cannot be observed, 
a forward looking principal designs the contract such that the contractor would exert 
optimal effort on the outsourced project. This is accomplished by writing an incentive 
contract contingent on the realized level of R&D output. It is shown that the optimal 
compensation comprises of a fixed component as well as a variable component that is 
contingent on realized project outcome. Essentially, the “carrot” strategy provides 
appropriate incentives to the contractor for exerting optimal effort on the project. Thus 
by using a carrot and stick strategy a firm may able to mitigate the two agency problems 
in outsourcing.  
 However, it is important to note that the two potential agency problems might 
lead to increased transaction costs of outsourcing. In Chapter II, a regime is considered 
where a technological solution is available to the principal firm to protect its IP. It is 
shown that when IP theft is plausible, the incentive payments must be higher compared 
to the situation where IP theft is impossible due to the technological solution. Likewise, 
in Chapter III, it is demonstrated that if a firm is willing to outsource tasks to a location 
with weak contractual enforcement, it needs to give higher incentive payments to the 
contractor. The increased incentive payment is an outcome of the agency problems in 
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outsourcing. Higher incentive payments lead to greater transaction costs and therefore, 
firms ought to assess these increased transaction costs with the benefits offered by 
outsourcing.  
 Finally, this dissertation also contributes to the “make or buy” decision of firms 
in the presence of the two kinds of agency problems. The existing literature typically 
favors integration as a solution to the IP theft problem. Moreover, the tradeoff between 
in-house inefficiency and IP loss in outsourcing has not been addressed in the literature. 
In Chapter III it is shown that the choice of organization (integration vs. outsourcing) 
depends on the degree of in-house inefficiency, the strength of contractual enforcement, 
and the value of the IP under consideration. An important finding is that firms need not 
confine themselves to inefficient integration even if there is possibility of IP 
misappropriation in outsourcing. Firms can still reap the benefits of outsourcing if they 
can design the contracts appropriately.  
The recommended strategy is to ensure that the shared IP cannot be duplicated 
easily by the contractor. As described in Chapter II, this may be accomplished by 
investing in complementary strategies like product differentiation, task modularization, 
and technological solutions. Firms might use business strategies to ensure that their 
products are differentiated at least as perceived by the customers. In Chapter IV, an 
event study is conducted on the epic case of Lexar trade secret theft by Toshiba. Even 
though its IP was misappropriated, Lexar continued with the outsourcing strategy and 
concentrated on product design and development. It sustained the trade secret theft by 
continuously investing in innovative designs and producing memory cards with greater 
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writing speed and higher capacities. Companies willing to outsource might revisit 
product differentiation strategy when it is difficult to protect their IP from supply chain 
contractors. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
First we derive the second best effort from the ICC of the agent. We use the first order 
approach to replace the ICC in (2.15) by its first order condition (Laffont and Martimort, 
2002). Thus 02 =−− eTT , or 
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Simplifying equation (A2) yields ( ) ( )TTvv −=−       (A3) 
Thus 1=λ , implying that the IRC binds at the optimum.    (A4) 
Plugging (A3) into (A1) yields optimal effort 
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Solving (A7) and (A6) leads to the optimal transfers specified in (2.16) Part (i). 
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We substitute e from (A5) in the Lagrangean of the optimization problem: 
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Equations (A8) and (A9) yield the optimal transfers specified in (2.23) Part (i). 
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FPFP TT ≤ follows from (2.23).       (A18) 
Combining (A10), (A11), (A17) and (A18) we get the ranking in Part (i) of (2.27).  
Combining (2.34),(A15), (A16) and (A13) we get the ranking stated in Part (ii) of (2.27). 
Finally combining (A12), (A14), (2.35) and (A13) we get the ranking specified in Part 
(iii) of (2.27). 
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The Lagrangean for the optimization problem stated in (3.7) is  
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Lagrangean yields  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
2
11
2
1 kluklhhvklhL −−⋅





−−−+−⋅





+−=
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 





+−−−⋅





−−−+⋅





+−⋅+ βλ sklhlklhhklh 2
4
1
2
11
2
1
 
The first order conditions with respect to λandklh ,, are simultaneously solved to 
obtain OOO klh ,, as specified in (3.8a), (3.8b), and (3.8c). The solution for Lagrange 
multiplier is λ=1 which implies that the IRC of the agent binds. Finally we substitute the 
values of OO lh , in equation (3.5) to obtain the optimal value of Oe as specified in (3.8d). 
Intuitively, the optimal values of OOOO eklh ,,, are obtained by equating the marginal 
benefit of each variable with its respective marginal cost. 
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When R&D is done in-house, the Lagrangean for the optimization problem is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22 11 elkehkeklukehvkeLI −⋅−−+⋅+⋅+−−⋅−−+−⋅+= µ  
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier. Substituting e from equation (3.12) into the 
Lagrangean yields  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
2
11
2
1 kluklh
d
hvklh
d
LI −−⋅





−−−+−⋅





+−=
 
( ) ( )













 −
−⋅





−−−+⋅





+−⋅+
2
4
1
2
11
2
1
d
lhlklh
d
hklh
d
µ  
The first order conditions with respect to µandklh ,, are simultaneously solved to obtain 
III klh ,, as specified in (3.14a), (3.14b), (3.14c). The solution for Lagrange multiplier is 
µ=1 which implies that the IRC of the agent binds. Finally we substitute the values of 
II lh , in equation (3.12) to obtain the optimal value of Ie as specified in (3.14e). 
  
155 
VITA 
 
Name:                   Rajorshi Sen Gupta 
Address:               600 Kimbrough Blvd., 309 Agricultural and Life Sciences Bldg. 
 2124 TAMU  
 College Station, TX 77843-2124 
 
Email Address:      rajorshisengupta@gmail.com 
Education:             PhD, Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University 
 M.A., Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University  
 B.S., Economics Honors, University of Calcutta 
 
Professional  Teaching Assistant, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Experience: Texas A&M University  
  
 Research Assistant, Texas Transportation Institute 
  
 Research Associate, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 
 New Delhi, India  
 
Publications:      Stochastic Dominance Approach to evaluate Optimism Bias in Truck- 
       Toll Forecasts. R. Sen Gupta, and S.R. Vadali, Transportation  
       Research Record, Journal of the Transportation Research Board, No.  
                             2066, 2008, 98–105. 
 
       Transmission of World Coffee Prices to Ugandan Growers. 
       M. Musumba, and R. Sen Gupta, Development Policy Review, 
       Forthcoming. 
 
Awards:      Tom Slick Fellowship 
       Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, Department of Agricultural 
       Economics, Texas A&M University 
       Who's Who Among Students in American Universities 
       Ford Foundation Scholarship  
 
